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 “Democracy Inaction?” 
 
 How “Fake-News” is Defining American Citizenship  
 
 This study examines the sociological implications of contemporary news-style political 
satire on the American public.  Comedic programs such as The Daily Show, The Colbert Report 
and The Onion have exploded in popularity in recent years, and have become a fairly influential 
part of the mainstream media’s field of political discourse.  These media texts stand next to, and 
in continual conversation with, the traditional newspapers and television broadcasts which they 
parody, revealing some of the hypocrisies and absurdities in government and media.  The rise of 
this genre has accompanied a shift in public ideology, toward anti-authoritarian and anti-
intellectual sentiments.  In the past several decades, there has been a well-documented decrease 
in public trust in government and journalism, and the perceived relationship between individuals 
and institutions has been altered.  The purpose of this study is to determine how political satirists 
define citizenship, and to examine the effect of political satire on viewers’ conceptualizations of 
citizenship.  Does satire create a cynical and disaffected populous, or does it encourage critical 
debate and proactive political attitudes and behaviors?  The original research conducted in this 
study consists of content analysis of satirical videos and survey data gathered from a national 
population. 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“The image of Americans that is reflected back to us by our political and 
media process is false… If the picture of us were true, our inability to solve 
problems would actually be quite sane and reasonable. Why would you work 
with Marxists actively subverting our Constitution or racists and homophobes 
who see no one’s humanity but their own? We hear every damn day about 
how fragile our country is -- on the brink of catastrophe -- torn by polarizing 
hate and how it’s a shame that we can’t work together to get things done, but 
the truth is we do. We work together to get things done every damn day.”  
- Jon Stewart (2010a.) 
 
 On October 30, 2010, comedian and host of The Daily Show Jon Stewart gave the 
above speech to an estimated 215,000 people gathered on the National Mall in Washington, 
D.C. at the culmination of the “Rally To Restore Sanity and/or Fear.”  The event, which he 
had organized with fellow television satirist Stephen Colbert, was both a demonstration of 
dissent and the development of a productive venue that would allow ordinary Americans to 
engage in political discourse separate from the partisan extremists that populate the news 
media.  He would later say about the speech, “We’d done twelve years of the show. I’d 
earned ten minutes of just rank sincerity and it felt like a great privilege to stand there 
amongst people who worked hard to get there, and have them listen to you tell them what 
you feel like…your work is about” (Stewart 2010b.)  As a news parodist and political 
satirist, Stewart stated that he believes his work is about humorously articulating the 
critiques many Americans have about their political and social circumstances.  The primary 
target of his scathing mockery in recent years has been what he calls “the country's 24 -hour 
politico pundit panic conflict-onator,” referring to the new political-media landscape that 
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feeds off of partisan conflict in Washington and “amplifies a division that I don’t  actually 
think is there at all” (Stewart 2010b).   
 If Stewart is correct in his belief that the political media in this country is reflecting a 
distorted version of American politics, such a condition has huge implications for how 
citizens grow to understand the structural organization of their society.  In particular, if the 
new media landscape gives partisan extremists the platforms to shut down democratic 
debate as they strategically vie for positions of power, the many moderate voices of the 
national majority are effectively excluded. With a democratic system of governance that 
was founded on the principle of every citizen possessing the power to influence the 
direction of their government, the abstraction of the individual from political processes 
poses a threat to its very legitimation.   
 Given that citizens in a democracy are partially reliant on the news media for the 
information necessary to make informed political decisions and take appropriate political 
action, it is important to recognize when media-industry motivations may have a corrupting 
influence on ordinary citizens.  Such has been Jon Stewart’s task during the past 14 years as 
host of a half-hour nightly comedy show, in which he parodies a cable news program in 
order to spotlight the ways in which that type of media might be misleading viewers.  In a 
similar fashion, Stephen Colbert (host of The Colbert Report) and satirical news 
organization The Onion walk the hyperreal line between comedy and news, and point out 
the potentially destructive absurdities and hypocrisies abound in national politics and media.  
By standing up against the forces that threaten the health of American democracy, Stewart 
and his colleagues serve an important function in defining the relationships between the 
government, media, and the citizenry.  
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 Political satire has existed nearly as long as humans have begun organizing 
themselves with some system of governance, and there is evidence dating back to ancient 
democratic Athens that satire has historically influenced public opinion (Rosen 2012).  In 
many societies since, satire has played a role in shaping how average citizens conceived of 
their social status in relation to that government.  As satire has evolved in its form, from 
poems and epigrams to political cartoons to the modern news parody, so has the genre’s 
context and ultimate task been changed.  
 The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion, to name three of the most 
popular examples of contemporary political satire franchises that will serve as the focus of 
this study, perform their task through expert parody of print, broadcast, and cable news 
media.  Sociologists have long studied the socializing role of mass media, trying to discover 
how media texts actively and uniformly shape the worldview of a large community in order 
to coordinate social action.  The political press, in particular, gives citizens access to 
political information that is critical for building their understanding of government functions 
and current happenings outside of their direct experience.  The news serves such vital 
functions for American political society, and therefore, it is also important for sociologists 
to take a closer look at media texts that offer alternative understandings of our world 
through their critique of traditional media.      
 The United States is a nation comprised of 300 million people, who come from 
incredibly diverse backgrounds and have quite different lived experiences.  Yet, we all call 
ourselves American citizens, and live under the same rule of law and same general moral 
principles that allow us to coordinate our numerous and diverse actions into a complex but 
highly-organized society.  At the top of this organizational structure is the federal 
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government.  In order for this system of legislators, administrators, and arbitrators to be able 
to direct the human action of 300 million people, it must be seen as a legitimate form of 
social control by those people.  The philosophy behind the United States’ representational 
democracy posits that citizens are able to influence public policy according to their needs 
through the people they elect into office.  How can the multiple and diverse interests of 
millions of people be effectively negotiated in this system?  How do political communities 
work when social ties become increasingly fragmented?  Why do modern Americans remain 
loyal to a legal system that facilitates social control, when we are acutely aware of 
conditions of political corruption and structural inequalities that give certain groups of 
people unequal access to power?    
 This study attempts to answer some of these questions regarding weakening social 
cohesion and the growing crisis of legitimation in relationship to political satire.  What does 
this genre of media do for American citizens who are growing disillusioned with their 
government and less trusting of their information sources?  Does the act of pointing out the 
flaws and hypocrisies in our organizing institutions threaten their authority, or does it make 
them more relevant to the lives of individuals?  Is a critical, cynical mode of political 
discourse harmful or healthy for democratic society?  Chapter two contextualizes these 
questions through a discussion of some of the existing literature on political satire and its 
effects.  In chapter three, I use the theories of Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Jürgen 
Habermas to provide a sociological foundation for my research questions and to construct 
ideal definitions of citizenship that are utilized throughout the study.  Chapter four explains 
the conceptualization and operationalization processes of the study’s methodological 
development, and details how both qualitative and quantitative data was gathered.  The 
5 
 
study’s results are presented in chapter five, and chapter six contains a discussion of the 
results.  Chapter seven concludes the thesis, contributing new insights regarding the social 
function of political comedy in American society. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The academic literature on The Daily Show and similar forms of political comedy has 
grown exponentially in recent years, in large part due to their increasing significance within 
popular culture and a growing recognition of their potential to impact the nation’s political 
processes in a variety of ways.  Through a review of recent studies that have explained the trend, 
I will show that the popularity of political comedy in the form of journalistic parody provides the 
basis for an important sociological study which asks how definitions of citizenship in the post-
modern society are influenced by the genre, and how this in turn impacts political-social 
behaviors.   
 Political satire is a significant phenomenon, in part due to the size of its viewership, 
particularly in comparison to traditional news sources.  A 2007 national survey reported that 16 
percent of Americans were regular viewers of The Daily Show or its spin-off The Colbert Report, 
ratings that rival major news programs such as Fox News’ The O’Reilly Factor (watched 
regularly by 17 percent of the nation), and NewsHour with Jim Lehrer on PBS (14 percent) (Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press 2007b).  More generally, the public’s news 
consumption patterns are shifting.  In the lead-up to the 2012 presidential election, another study 
conducted in January 2012(a) by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found a 
broad drop in the numbers of Americans getting campaign news from traditional sources, such as 
newspapers, local and network TV news.  Only 20 percent of respondents reported that they 
regularly learn something about the election from newspapers (compared with 31 percent in 
2008 and 40 percent in 2000).  Late night comedy shows, on the other hand, have risen as a 
regular news source for the general public, cited by nine percent of respondents (up from six 
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percent in 2000), and as many as 15 percent of young people ages 18-29.  The study notes that it 
is “the only campaign news source tested that young people turn to more than older people” 
(p.10).  
 Parallel to the shift in news consumption patterns, there has been a change in the public’s 
opinion of its news sources.  Generally, negative opinions of the press’ performance are on the 
rise, with a strong majority of people believing news stories are inaccurate, biased, or influenced 
by powerful people and organizations (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2011).  
Remarkably, in such a critically cynical environment, comedian Jon Stewart was ranked fourth 
on the list of America’s most admired journalists, tied with anchormen Brian Williams, Tom 
Brokaw, Dan Rather, and cable news host Anderson Cooper (Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press 2007a).  Stewart has repeatedly rejected the notion that people consider his 
show anything more than a satirical comedy show, and is often quoted as saying things such as, 
“We feel no obligation to follow the news cycle.  In other words, I felt no obligation to cover [a 
particular] story in any way, because… we're not journalists” (Stewart 2007). 
 The tension between the stated intention of political comedy from its creators 
(entertainment) and the perceptions of the general public (information source) are not easily 
ignored.  The topic has received attention from media scholars, psychologists and political 
scientists who seek to figure out the real impact of parody on public opinion and civic behavior.  
This literature review will first discuss the role of traditional journalism in constructing political 
knowledge, suggesting that the mainstream press has contributed to anti-authoritarian and anti-
intellectual public attitudes which have in turn negatively affected levels of trust in the news.  I 
will then outline the rise of satirical news outlets in recent decades in response to the declining 
trust in reporting, and problematize the labels of “real” vs. “fake” news, in part through a 
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comparison of content.  I will then discuss the rhetorical aspects of journalistic satire, drawing on 
Bakhtinian models of parodic discourse, and suggesting the genre serves a critical function for 
democratic societies.  Finally, I will detail a few of the recent experimental studies that attempt 
to uncover the impacts of modern political satire on levels of institutional trust, political learning, 
political participation, and levels of cynicism.       
 
CONTEMPORARY JOURNALISM AND CYNICISM 
 Sociologists and media critics have long debunked the myth that journalism is an 
objective or neutral endeavor that presents an accurate portrayal of a social reality.  The press is 
inescapably ideological in nature, with the selection and presentation of new stories conforming 
to established societal and journalistic values, and furthermore, driven by profit interests 
(Croteau, Hoynes, and Milan 2011).  Nonetheless, U.S. citizens depend on the news to receive 
information about political matters—a realm that many people do not often come in contact with 
directly.  The American representative system of governance puts policy decisions in the hands 
of a small pool of elected and appointed political elites, locating government happenings far 
outside of our direct experience.  Richard Davis has suggested that political socialization, “the 
process by which people from childhood on develop cognitions, attitudes, and behavioral 
patterns about politics,” is achieved in significant part through the agent of mass media 
(1992:241).  He points to a growing body of research that confirms media’s effect on people’s 
(particularly young people’s) awareness and knowledge of politics, as well as their values, 
attitudes, and opinions of government institutions.  Due to the fact that most Americans rely on 
news organizations to inform them of civic matters, journalists hold a significant amount of 
influential power over the public, shaping our individual opinions and our social reality 
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according to particular narratives. Popular opinion is simultaneously reflected and created in the 
press. 
 Michael Schudson (1999) argues in his essay “Social Origins of Press Cynicism in 
Portraying Politics” that, over the past several decades, the press and traditional media have 
been fostering audience’s negative attitudes towards the government through their own cynical 
portrayals.  He points to an “anti-politics bias and a corporate tilt toward infotainment” in the 
news that shapes a particularly negative worldview (p.998).  The causes of this pessimistic 
journalism, he believes, stem from factors such as journalists’ declining deference to authority 
and increased professionalism, as well as a growing emphasis on thematic coherence within the 
industry.  In the wake of government and media scandals during the Vietnam War and Nixon 
administration, reporters and editors have earned an increased authority relative to their sources, 
and have grown more analytical and self-conscious in their political coverage.  At the same time, 
there has been pressure to thematize and package television news within a coherent narrative 
frame for cultural, political, and commercial reasons. Thus, the changing norms of journalistic 
behavior having an impact on how political news is presented to the public, which unsurprisingly 
contributes to a lowered level of institutional trust for those who consume it.  
 In his assessment of the current state of American journalism, Schudson says that the 
press historically has had populist and anti-intellectual tendencies, and dedicated itself to “the 
political enlightenment of its citizens” using appeals to the amateur rather than the expert 
(p.999).  Contemporary debates about the supposed failings of the news media are focused on 
this role of the press to educate the electorate and develop “good” (well-informed) citizens.  The 
primary academic criticisms, he points out, are that political reporting “is increasingly organized 
by presumptions that stem from cynicism in the press corps and promote cynicism in the 
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audience,” and “that news institutions increasingly blur news and entertainment, even fact and 
fiction” (p.999).  
 A similar critique of the press by Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson entitled 
Spiral of Cynicism (1997) points out that today’s press coverage of political elections centers 
around a narrative of strategy.  Election stories use the language of war and competition to create 
winners and losers, emphasize the performances of the candidates staged for critics and 
audiences (pundits and voters), and put heavy weight on polls as a measure of who is ahead or 
behind in the horse race, as opposed to discussion of issues and policies.  The authors go on to 
experiment with news framing and opinion, suggesting that audience cynicism is “activated” by 
such narratives of strategy and conflict (p.159), while stories that highlight social issues and 
public policies may also induce cynicism in a frustrated audience who do not believe political 
actors can reasonably resolve a debate.  Thus, the role of the press to inform the democratic 
electorate is colored by media narratives that are populist in basic nature, portraying political 
elites as perpetually conflictual and as the source of many of the nation’s social problems. 
 Popular cynicism, however, is not limited to opinions of the government.  Somewhat 
ironically, the news media is becoming less respected as an institution on which we rely for 
political information.  Dependency on the news media entails some level of trust—we want to 
believe that our primary source of knowledge about the world is measurably accurate and fair.  
However, public opinion of news organizations has been growing increasingly negative, at least 
over the past several decades since the Pew Research Center began surveying evaluations of 
press performance.  In 1985, 34 percent of Americans said that news organizations present 
inaccurate facts, 53 percent believed that news organizations were often influenced powerful 
people and organizations, and 53 percent thought they tended to favor one side.  By 2011, those 
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numbers have jumped markedly: 66 percent thought news stories were often inaccurate, 80 
percent thought they were influenced by powerful figures, and 77 percent saw bias in the 
reporting (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2011).  In this context, Jon Stewart 
has lamented his status as a respected journalist, saying “The embarrassment is that I am given 
credibility in this world because of the disappointment that the public has in what the news 
media does” (Stewart 2011).  The press is directing cynicism toward the government and 
producing consumer distrust in its own product, turning people towards alternative sources of 
political information.  
 
THE RISE OF FAKE NEWS 
 As respect for broadcast journalism has declined over the past several decades, so has 
America witnessed a rise in the popularity of journalistic parody.  As a genre, fake news 
programs are adept at pointing out the problems and absurdities of our political system, while 
simultaneously lampooning the ways in which political information is presented in the media.  
This next section will take a look at the evolution of the genre in the United States, and how it 
compares to its predecessor, the “real” news. 
 Considered the pioneer in mainstream satirical humor was Mad Magazine, a comic-based 
publication that began in 1952 and parodied a variety of cultural topics.  It was not until 1975 
that televised news parody appeared in the United States with the 1975 premiere of Saturday 
Night Live’s mock newscast segment “Weekend Update.”  In this bit, fake anchor Chevy Chase 
would sit behind a news desk, presenting some of the week’s news headlines followed by a 
mocking one-liner joke.  It was followed by a short-lived HBO series called Not Necessarily the 
News from 1983-1990, which often edited or overdubbed actual news footage for comedic effect.  
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Perhaps the most successful news parody franchise, The Onion, began as a locally-distributed 
satirical newspaper in 1988 in Madison, Wisconsin, and gained national attention with the launch 
of its website in 1996.  The company was purchased by Comedy Central in 2000, enabling them 
to increase their scope, production quality, and audience. Their series of online sketch videos 
under the title The Onion News Network launched in 2007, and has enjoyed international 
popularity.  The Daily Show hosted by Craig Kilborn premiered on Comedy Central in 1996, and 
was originally a late-night fake newscast featuring a comedic monologue of the day’s headlines, 
in addition to segments satirizing on-location reports and debates from regular correspondents.  It 
lampooned the superficiality of local news figures, and rarely ventured into the realm of national 
or international topics.  What the show did, much like “Weekend Update,” was use the news 
format as a vehicle for joke-telling (Tally 2011).  When comedian Jon Stewart took over the 
program in 1999, he made the decision to redirect the show’s focus from pop culture and 
entertainment content toward topics of politics and news media.  Perhaps the most insightful and 
influential satirical program, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart developed a highly critical 
editorial voice during the 2000 presidential election, which it covered under the mocking title 
“Indecision 2000.”  The show produced a spin-off starting in 2005 with former Daily Show 
correspondent Stephen Colbert stepping into the fictional character of a right-wing cable news 
pundit in The Colbert Report.  
 Since then, the comedic duo of Stewart and Colbert has exploded in popularity, and has 
become a pop culture institution that, ironically, holds quite a bit of political clout.  High-status 
politicians, foreign ambassadors, and political activists often come on the shows to be 
interviewed by the comedians, while both Stewart and Colbert have been active outside of their 
programs in matters of politics and media.  Most famously, Stewart has been credited with 
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putting an end to CNN’s political debate show Crossfire after appearing on the program in 2004 
and soberly accusing hosts Tucker Carlson and Paul Begala of being “partisan hacks” whose 
absurd, hate-fueled political theater was “hurting America” (Stewart 2004a).  On October 30, 
2010, Stewart and Colbert hosted a political rally on Washington, D.C.’s National Mall called 
“Rally to Restore Sanity and/or Fear,” whose purpose was to promote reasoned public discussion 
against the polarized extremists that “control the conversation” of United States politics by 
demonizing those on the opposite side of the partisan spectrum.   
 In his discussion of the potential impact of today’s political satire on national culture, 
Geoffrey Baym (2006) situates The Daily Show at the crossroads of news, entertainment, public 
affairs, and pop culture, which are increasingly converging, and in his opinion, degrading the 
quality of broadcast journalism.  He writes that, “The once-authoritative nightly news has been 
fractured, replaced by a variety of programming strategies ranging from the latest version of 
network ‘news lite’ to local news happy talk and 24-hour cable news punditry” (p.259).  As a 
result, “some of the principles of good journalism—independence, inquiry, and verification—are 
often sacrificed to meet the demand for eye-catching content…to complicate the matter, the 
public appears to be growing dissatisfied with its broadcast news alternatives” (pp.259-260).  
Thus “fake news” in the style of Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert occupies an almost natural 
place in the television schedule, looking like a combination of traditional newscast and cable 
news punditry, yet never claiming to be unbiased, inquisitive, or factual.  
 Citing statistics that 21 percent of people ages 18-29 claim to regularly learn about news 
and politics from political comedy shows (an demographic that is an estimated 40% of The Daily 
Show’s audience), Baym notes that “the show is playing in the domain of serious political 
communication,” particularly when it serves as a forum for politicians who are guests on the 
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show (p.260).  He emphasizes the program’s importance in relation to traditional media by 
arguing:  
 The label of ‘fake news’ also has a deeper problem. Any notion of ‘fake’ depends upon 
an equal conception of ‘real.’  Fake news necessitates assumptions about some kind of 
authentic or legitimate set of news practices, ideals that one rarely hears articulates or 
necessarily sees as evident today… [N]ews…is defined and constrained by a set of 
cultural practices, informal and often implicit agreements about proper conduct, style, 
and form that are in flux, increasingly multiple, debatable, and open for reconsideration. 
(Baym 2006:261) 
 
In the context of an evolving media environment, where media outlets are multiplying in number 
but consolidating ownership and integrating with other social structures, Baym conceives of The 
Daily Show as an “experiment in journalism” growing from the innovative phenomenon of 
discursive integration, which aims to revive a journalism of critical inquiry and advance a model 
of deliberative democracy.  While Stewart and Colbert insist that they have no such 
agenda
1
,Baym insists that the show should not be understood as “fake news,” but “as an 
alternative journalism, one that uses satire to interrogate power, parody to critique contemporary 
news, and dialogue to enact a model of deliberative democracy” (p.261).  
  At a period in which journalistic conventions are in flux, the fake news programs, from 
which viewers glean significant amounts of information alongside comedy, are offering their 
interpretation of what real news should strive for: challenging the legitimacy and authority of our 
leaders while searching for truth through inquiry.  McBeth and Clemons (2011) argue that the 
fake news is the real news, because it has the impact that traditional journalism “should” have—
                                                          
1
 Excerpt from Jon Stewart interview with Fox News Sunday’s Chris Wallace, June 2011:  
WALLACE: I think your agenda is more out there, and you're pushing more of an agenda than you pretend to.  
STEWART: I disagree with you. I think that I'm pushing comedy and my ideological agenda informs it, at all times. 
Now, that agenda or my ideology is at times liberal, at times can lean more conservative, but it's about absurdity. It's 
about absurdity and it's about corruption. And that is the agenda that we push. It is an anti-corruption, anti-lack of 
authenticity, anti-contrivance, and if I see that more in one area than I do in another, well then I will defend every 
single thing that we put on that show. And I'm not dodging you in any way by suggesting that our main thrust is 
comedy (Stewart 2011). 
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strengthening democracy, informing policy debate, creating a discourse that engages alternative 
views, and ultimately impacting public opinion to encourage political participation.  They argue 
that “much of American political coverage is inauthentic (fake) and that the programs of Jon 
Stewart and Stephen Colbert both represent authentic (real) discourse that breaks through the 
shell of the real (fake) news revealing layers of social construction, empty symbolism, and 
simulacra—thus positively affecting the traditional coverage and political discourse” (p.81). In a 
sense, applications of the definitions of “real” and “fake” are not determined by the author of the 
content, but by the reader; whatever mediated information is shaping the public’s political reality 
is what is most real.  
 
COMPARING CONTENT: REAL VERSUS FAKE NEWS  
 While the distinction between “fake” and “real” news appears to be blurring in the minds 
of media critics, it is important to identify the differences and similarities between the two in 
terms of what kind of information they are providing to their viewers.  For this, I will now look 
to comparative content analyses that reveal what is actually being discussed in the traditional and 
satirical news universes.  
 The Pew Research Center’s Project for Journalistic Excellence conducted an extensive 
survey throughout 2007 (published in 2008) on the content and viewership of The Daily Show, 
producing several relevant conclusions.  Although the range of topics covered by the program is 
more limited than the mainstream news press, the study’s authors point out “striking” similarities 
between the content of the two texts.  For the year of 2007, the programs shared the same top 
two topics, U.S. Foreign Affairs (constituting 17 percent of air time on The Daily Show and 19 
percent in the mainstream press), and Politics & Elections (16 percent of The Daily Show’s air 
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time versus 12 percent in the mainstream press).  However, they diverged slightly in the lesser 
categories, with The Daily Show taking greater interest in the government, lifestyle news, the 
press and media, and celebrities, while the mainstream news devoted more time to non-U.S. 
related foreign affairs, crime, disasters, health, business, and the economy.  
 Because the show has no journalistic obligation to conform their coverage to the news 
cycle, their agenda is much more simply narrowed on those topics that are easily lampooned.   
That is perhaps why the top two stories in 2007 combined (the 2008 campaign and the policy 
debate about the Iraqi war) commanded a full quarter (26 percent) of The Daily Show’s news 
coverage, compared to 18 percent in the mainstream press.  The study also points out that some 
topics that dominate the mainstream press are simply not mentioned on the comedy program at 
all.  For example, the show shied away from two major tragedies in 2007: the bridge collapse in 
Minneapolis that resulted in the deaths of 13 people, and the shootings at Virginia Tech, about 
which Stewart expressed sadness at the beginning of his show, saying, “I have absolutely nothing 
to add that is insightful or anything” (qtd. in The Pew Center’s Project for Excellence in 
Journalism 2008).  
 Despite some key differences in content, the Pew study concludes that “The Daily Show 
is indeed journalistic.  Its topic agenda is highly focused on the public square, on issues of 
significance, particularly those focused around Washington.  Its agenda is not dissimilar, indeed, 
from other cable talk shows.  The language is even more blunt, and its point often more direct.  
The Daily Show is no doubt entertainment, but it is entertainment, measurably, with a substantive 
point” (2008:15). 
 In another comparison of content between The Daily Show and mainstream newscasts 
(ABC’s World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, CBS’s Evening News with Dan Rather, and 
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NBC’s The Nightly News with Tom Brokaw), Fox, Koloen, and Sahin (2007) found that they 
contained, on average, fairly equal quantities of substantive information about the 2004 
presidential conventions and debates.  The data for this experiment were analyzed using the 
entire program as a unit of analysis, and again using each news story as a unit of analysis (as The 
Daily Show’s 30-minute program typically contains a greater proportion of stories about political 
affairs than network news), producing the same finding: the substance, categorized as concepts 
of campaign issues and candidate qualifications, were quantitatively the same.  What differed 
between the programs was the quality of information presentation: The Daily Show emphasized 
humor (coded as moments of joking and laughter) over substantive content, while the broadcast 
network news stories contained more hype  (coded as concepts of horse race and hoopla) than 
substance.  The later finding is not necessarily surprising, given the contemporary media 
environment that stresses “infotainment.”  It provides more empirical evidence to support the 
widely-held belief that traditional journalism is failing in its mission to present objective political 
information to the public and cultivate an informed electorate.  Meanwhile, the finding about The 
Daily Show’s content remains consistent with Stewart and Colbert’s continuously repeated 
mission of creating comedy over news. 
 Regardless of whether we consider these comedy programs to be substantive journalism 
or not, the fact remains that they function as a source of entertainment and information for 
millions of Americans.  Further, they serve as a type of political discourse that critically 
examines the increasingly complex relationships between individuals and public institutions.  
The following section will examine the rhetoric of political news parody, and begin to question 
the nature of citizenship in the postmodern democracy.     
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RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL NEWS PARODY  
 Rhetorical discussions of parody usually center on Russian philosopher Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s theoretical models of dialogism and the carnival.  In pre-reformation Europe, 
“carnival” marked the period of time when social hierarchies and cultural norms were 
temporarily suspended, allowing the laity to critique institutionalized power in what Bakhtin 
calls “the people’s second life, organized on the basis of laughter” (qtd. in Achter 2008:279).  As 
a historical predecessor to modern satire, carnival is described by Paul Achter (2008) as “a 
prevailing mood or spirit of fun mixed with social criticism, and its self-reflexive, playful 
discourse practices mark the enduring value of humor and laughter in the public arena” (p.280).  
Closely related to carnival is Bakhtin’s concept of dialogic discourse, which suggests there is a 
continuous dialogue between cultural texts, always informing and influencing each other.  Zoë 
Druick (2009) defines dialogism as “the connection of each utterance to a linguistically mediated 
social field,” which, applied to the genre of televised news parody, means that there is a strong 
lexical association between satirical texts and institutionalized press (p.300).  Further, such 
programs ask audiences to reflect on the production aspects of broadcast news, to recognize the 
problems with its power to prescribe “official” forms of culture, and potentially question its 
authority as the “discourse of the real” (p.301).  At the same time, however, the use of 
mainstream news conventions reinforces the very discourse which it mocks.  Thus, as a form of 
discourse, news parody is an example of the temporary reversal of power that characterized the 
medieval carnival.  Although television shows like The Daily Show and The Colbert Report and 
newspapers like The Onion are a form of social critique, they are continually constrained by 
power relationships, industry rules and conventions, and texts produced by other actors—the 
ones they are mocking. 
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 Druick concludes her essay by asking if the popularity of parody news shows indicates 
the exhaustion of televised broadcast news, or if it is “nothing more than a remnant of a more 
powerful popular energy of inversion and dissent?” (p.306).  Certainly, popular opposition to 
authority has always existed, and satire has for a long time served as a tool for questioning and 
challenging the basis of power.  Druick believes that, at most, the growth of contemporary news 
parody indicates skepticism, particularly among today’s youth, toward the authority of the news 
and government.    
 Conversely, Robert Hariman (2008) argues that political humor is a critical tool for 
sustaining a culture of political engagement in a democracy.  Parodic forms in particular create 
“productive articulation of public identity and agency” through the following rhetorical 
operations, based off of Bakhtin’s model: doubling, carnivalesque spectatorship, leveling, and 
transforming the world of speech into an agnostic field of proliferating voices (p.253).  Comic 
doubling, he explains, involves the imitation of a particular format, while injecting ambiguity 
into the object and suggesting the capability for it to be something else (or nothing at all).  For 
example, news parody follows the recognizable form and style of a traditional newscast, but 
presents a contradictory reality that destabilizes the relationship between form and content.  
Similarly, the targeting of authoritative subjects exposes the “actors behind the masks,” 
temporarily inverting power relationships in a carnivalesque manner.  Furthermore, Hariman 
believes that the elements of silliness and laughter “annihilate” structures of domination, which 
has a leveling effect on people’s conceptions of power structures.  When authority is exposed as 
an image and the scripts of hierarchy are disrupted, resistance becomes a more viable response.  
Finally, parody portrays the field of public discourse as a dynamic space where numerous voices 
comment and debate on the social world.  In summation, Hariman argues that “The long-term 
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effect of a public culture alive with parody is an irreverent democratization of the conventions of 
public discourse, which in turn keeps speech closer to its audiences and their experience in the 
public world” (p.258).  Such an effect is critical for a democratic society to function effectively; 
it equips citizens to be able “to negotiate plural interests based on realistic accounts of self, other, 
and a world of change” (p.259).  A public consciousness that contains a good dose of parodic 
representations leaves space for bottom-up political and social change.  The application of 
Bakhtinian frames by Druick and Hariman provide a starting point for understanding how 
political parody and notions of citizenship are intimately connected.    
 In his analysis of 25 political clips from the The Onion’s online video series, The Onion 
News Network, Don J. Waisanen (2011) argues that the parodist sketch comedy invites new civic 
understandings of media and political institutions through its distinct rhetorical style which he 
calls “ironic iconicity.”  The Onion’s fake broadcasts, he indicates, are near-perfect replicas of 
the real programs in style, structure, and delivery, offering distorted content as the only 
difference—and it is in that ironic recognition of the journalistic imitation with exaggerated 
content that is the source of humor.  This practice diverges from comedy shows like The Daily 
Show and Saturday Night Live’s “Weekend Update”, “where social critique is often dampened 
by outrageous farcical exaggeration,” where the actors make known to the audience that they are 
crafting a joke (p.509).  The Onion makes no such obvious indications that it is fake news, 
instead delivers the stories with deadpan seriousness and professionally-produced visuals.  Thus, 
The Onion News Network “walks a hyperreal line,” juxtaposing “veristic and slightly fanaticized 
structure, delivery, and content” in a manner that focuses on “the contingency, recursivity, and 
ethical judgment of mainstream news broadcasts” (p.509).  The effect is that the viewer’s 
attention is drawn toward the taken-for-granted conventions of the media.  Take, for example, 
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the air of certainty imbued in newscasts that masks the fact that they are creating narratives, 
editorializing, and relying on other media for their own reports.  By twisting news conventions to 
deliver bizarre and hyperreal content, The Onion “interrogates the constructedness of fact and 
fiction in the news” and questions the legitimacy of the broadcast media’s claim to represent a 
factual reality (p.513).  Additionally, Waisanen argues that The Onion serves a recursive 
function, building off of the rituals and patterns of newsmaking to encourage a creative social 
discourse in online forums.  However, The Onion’s satirical critique does not leave its notions of 
civic duty completely open for interpretation; the franchise delivers a set of stable moral 
judgments that are amplified in their hyperreal space.  Because the world of The Onion is 
remarkably similar to our own, audiences are able to recognize our society’s moral conflicts that 
are spotlighted when they are exaggerated in the fake news.     
 The function of The Onion’s sketch videos, then, is to “craft broader outlooks for 
understanding the systemic political issues and social terrain that we all inhabit” (Waisanen 
2011:524).  Not only does the institution encourage audiences to be more aware of the rhetorical 
dynamics at play in the news media, but it asks them to consider the public and political habits 
that are harmful to society at large.  Waisanen believes that the moral judgments presented in 
these hyperreal journalistic spaces offer the public alternative conceptions of reality.  In these 
depictions of a fatalistic version of our society, there is space left open for improvement.   
 In a similarly optimistic analysis of the discourse of The Daily Show and The Colbert 
Report, Waisanen (2009) identifies three rhetorical strategies of the comedians that he argues are 
critically reframing political discourse in America and “creatively guiding audiences toward 
democratic possibilities” (p.120).  He points out that, while political comedy can often be 
divisive or cynical, “Stewart and Colbert ultimately embrace their targets while pointing out their 
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potential flaws” and affirm democratic ideals whenever they draw attention to social absurdities 
and contradictions (p.121).  His empirical study examined 40 clips of political content from each 
of the programs, in addition to transcripts from two of the comedians’ more controversial 
appearances on other cable news programs (Jon Stewart on CNN”s Crossfire in 2007 and 
Stephen Colbert on The O’Reilly Factor in 2007). 
 Waisanen identifies three common strategies of incongruous-perspective comedy that he 
argues advance democratic attitudes in larger society: parodic polyglossia, satirical specificity, 
and contextual clash.  Polyglossia refers to the way in which Stewart and Colbert push their 
perspectives through expanded linguistic capacities–-moving between various political and 
cultural personae in a manner that is not seen in the real political or journalistic world.  For 
example, Stewart most often plays ‘himself,” a concerned, disbelieving citizen, but easily shifts 
into character voices to add life and color to his jokes.  Colbert’s portrayal of a right-wing pundit 
is contrasted by gestures that indicate to the audience that he is in character, and his statements 
should not be interpreted literally.  The variety of voices they use to present a single story invites 
viewers to reflect on the possibility of multiple perspectives (a concept that is notably absent 
from most broadcast news presentations).  Similarly, like the rhetoric of contingency in The 
Onion News Network clips (Waisanen 2011), Stewart and Colbert reveal the constructedness of 
their form and style, not-so-subtly hinting at the more covert constructedness of the real news.  
 Satirical specificity is used by Stewart and Colbert to demystify vague ideologies of the 
political world by breaking down grand abstractions (e.g. values like “family,” “equality,” and 
“freedom”) and engaging in practical evaluations of specific policy details and political claims.  
While the media-viewing public is often comforted by such appeals in political speeches, the 
comedians critically appraise the content of their claims rather than their style—and do so with 
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frankness and the use of everyday language.  The essential function of this, Waisanen argues, is 
to “direct critical accountability toward the suasive, mystifying merger in terms of politics and 
media” (p.130).  
 Colbert and Stewart further provide critique of political culture and social situations “by 
bringing into conscious view the very constructedness of many social environments” through a 
strategy called contextual clash–the mixing of seemingly unrelated contexts (p.130).  By 
denaturalizing normal situations and naturalizing absurd ones, they point out how media 
environments shape our attitudes toward a given situation.  Waisanen concludes that these 
comical rhetorical strategies practiced daily on these programs do several things to advance 
democratic life: encouraging playful (rather than combative) debate that incorporates a variety of 
voices; making abstract political matters relevant and engaging to audiences; promoting 
reflexivity over faux certitude in media discourse; generating attention toward public matters 
using comic frames rather than tragic frames, which encourage rather than shut down debate; and 
exposing the patterns of power in political communications.  The comical critiques are constantly 
“reminding or instructing their audiences about moral and democratic possibilities…to thus deny 
that Stewart and Colbert make a positive contribution to democracy would be to deny the very 
task of rhetorical study…” (p.134). 
 Paul Achter (2008) performs a more nuanced analysis of how comedy functions in 
moments of national crisis, and consequently sheds light on the relationship between citizens, 
news, and news parody.  In his article “Comedy in Unfunny Times: News Parody and Carnival 
After 9/11,” Achter notes that, following the September 11th terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, many 
comedic voices were paralyzed, finding themselves unable (or pressured not) to respond directly 
to the tragedy.  As the public was faced with fundamental changes in public discourse, so 
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emerged the issue of decorum—what constituted an “appropriate” joke was far from clear2.  
Achter argues that news parody, The Onion in particular, was particularly well-equipped to 
“surmount the rhetorical chill that fell over U.S. public culture” because it exposed contemporary 
journalism as an increasingly-prevalent agent of narrative construction (p.267).  At the same time 
as it challenged the monologism of the news, parody programs created a compelling “second 
world” for audiences to contemplate the 9/11 attacks.  Achter explains, “Although The Onion 
shares with real journalism the goal of producing informed and engaged cultural citizens, it 
frames 9/11 and most of its stories as stories about the news, in stark contrast to the seeming 
disappearance of the news in its usual rhetorical formulation” (p.286).  It thus set up a 
carnivalesque perspective that challenged the conceptual frames provided by the mainstream 
news—and provided a space for healing separate from serious discourse.  Most critically, it 
created opportunities for citizens to construct their own meanings of the politically and 
emotionally-charged topics, rather than allowing news outlets to frame it for them.       
 Other researchers on the topic have sought to understand the appeal of the shows’ 
humorously ironic interpretations of real-world events.  Richard Van Heertrum (2011) suggests 
that the irony Stewart and Colbert use in crafting their comedy exemplifies the “language of 
cool” that is adroitly understood and spoken by younger generations.  Irony, defined as the 
detachment of figurative and literal meaning, is “a vehicle for critique that protects [individuals] 
from the appearance of deeper political engagement” (p.117).  The underlying dynamic at work 
is “a critique of the current order of things connected to cynicism about the possibility of real 
change” (p.117).  Such is the political stance that describes many of today’s youth raised on the 
tenets of neoliberalism: individualistic, fatalistic, anti-political and anti-intellectual, and defined 
                                                          
2
 Interestingly, a panel of comedy writers, editors, and performers convened in New York a month after the attacks 
to discuss how to proceed in their jobs, and to explore the paradox of creating comedy in unfunny times. 
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by their ability to step outside mainstream culture.  However, Van Heertrum does not consider 
cynicism an inherently destructive attitude.  Instead, he believes it has revolutionary potential—
the satirist opens up space for critique and suggests possibility for social transformation.  
However, he lacks vehicles for inciting real social change.  Stewart has mirrored this perception 
when speaking of his own work, saying, “I can always criticize, but I can’t actually do 
anything…The ultimate feeling for me of satire is, it helps deflate something that you might 
think is toxic.  But it doesn’t help build anything” (Stewart 2010b).   
 The rhetorical basis of political parody presents somewhat of a paradox.  By poking fun 
at powerful people and institutions, these programs provide critical examinations of modern 
power structures and shed light on the hypocrisies and absurdities that run rampant in our 
government and media.  Parody, in this case, serves as a watchdog, holding politicians, pundits, 
and journalists accountable for their words and actions.  Political satirists, particularly Jon 
Stewart, have proven to be particularly integral in inspiring both laughter and outrage among the 
American public, using comedy combined with factual evidence as their weapons.    
 On the other hand, by approaching serious topics using heavily ironic humor, political 
satire separates itself from the real-world political landscape, and expresses a sharp cynicism that 
undermines any possibility of changing the very things it points out to be absurdly problematic.  
Thus, it is unclear what messages of citizenship news parody programs are sending to an 
audience, or what messages viewers take away from them.  Several studies have attempted to 
measure the effects of political satire exposure, to see what viewers learn, think about, or do after 
consuming this type of media.  Some key studies in this field are outlined in the following 
section.  
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ATTITUDINAL AND BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF VIEWERSHIP   
 Jody Baumgartner and Jonathan S. Morris (2006) conducted one of the most cited studies 
on the topic, entitled “The Daily Show Effect: Candidate Evaluations, Efficacy, and American 
Youth,” measuring the attitudinal effects of political comedy on young viewers.  In a controlled 
experiment using 732 college students, two groups were shown different clips on the topic of the 
2004 Presidential candidates and given a posttest questionnaire.  The first group saw a 
manipulation of coverage from The Daily Show that focused on generating humorous jokes about 
both candidates, while the second group watched a “mainstream” news clip from the CBS 
Evening News, which presented “serious” television news.  The experimenters were careful to 
make sure that both clips contained similar content, equalizing as much as possible the amount of 
time each one devoted to the “horse race” and “strategy” aspects of the campaign, and to images 
and descriptions of each candidate.  Due to The Daily Show’s style that mimics a traditional 
newscast, the delivery of the messages was similar.  Controlling for content and presentation 
style, the main difference between the clips was “The Daily Show’s inclusion of sarcasm and 
humor” (p.348).  A third group did not watch any televised clips, but filled out the same 
questionnaire, in addition to an extra control-group-only questionnaire that measured their long-
term exposure to other sources of political information.  
 The researcher’s hypotheses, that 1) exposure to The Daily Show lowers overall candidate 
evaluations and 2) that it lowers evaluations of the lesser known candidates more than the ones 
that are well known, were supported by the data analysis.  It also supported the hypotheses that 
3) exposure increased cynicism toward both the electoral process and 4) the news media.  No 
such significant relationships were observed for the viewers of the CBS Evening News clip.  
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 The researchers conclude that, because cynicism “reflects low external efficacy,” young 
Americans who are exposed to The Daily Show have lower external efficacy—that is, they do not 
think governmental authorities and institutions are responsive to citizen demands.  However, one 
survey question measuring internal efficacy, defined as “beliefs about one’s own competence to 
understand, and to participate effectively in, politics,” indicated that it is greater for those 
exposed to The Daily Show.  The authors explain that “Stewart’s style of humor paints the 
complexities of politics as a function of the absurdity and incompetence of political elites, thus 
leading viewers to blame any lack of understanding not on themselves but on those who run the 
system.  In presenting politics as the theater of the absurd, Stewart seemingly simplifies it” 
(p.362). 
 The researchers note that in this laboratory experiment, those who reported watching The 
Daily Show less frequently (“hardly ever” or “never”) were more susceptible to the attitudinal 
affects than regular viewers, whom they suggest have developed a high level of cynicism from 
their prior experience with the show.  But the implications are not entirely clear; while The Daily 
Show may have a clear affect on young people’s opinions and attitudes, it did not measure if it 
changes their civic behaviors.    
 Xiaoxia Cao and Paul R. Brewer (2008) attempted to extend the study to examine 
political participation behaviors associated with lowered trust and cynical attitudes cultivated by 
The Daily Show.  They sought to challenge the notion by Baumgartner and Morris (2006) that 
exposure to the program has the potential to “dampen participation…by contributing to a sense 
of political alienation from the political process” by showing a positive correlation between 
exposure to political comedy shows and some forms of political participation (qtd. in Cao and 
Brewer 2008:90).  Believing that the increased internal political efficacy observed in 
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Baumgartner and Morris’ study are a strong indicator of political participation, and that negative 
portrayals of politicians and governmental institutions can trigger anxiety and motivate political 
action, they hypothesized a positive relationship between exposure to political comedy shows 
and political participation.    
 Through a telephone survey conducted during the early stages of the campaign for the 
2004 Democratic presidential nomination (Dec. 2004- Jan. 2004), 1,249 randomly-selected 
respondents were asked how often they learned something about the campaign or candidates 
from political comedy shows.  They were also asked how often they participated in one of the 
following activities (measures of political participation): contacting an elected official, attending 
a campaign event, joining an organization in support of a particular cause, and contributing 
money to a candidate running for public office.  Respondents also answered questions measuring 
political interest, political knowledge, exposure to traditional and online news sources, exposure 
to late-night talk shows, partisanship, and demographics.  They discovered that approximately 
one quarter of Americans regularly or sometimes learned about the democratic race from 
political comedy shows, and such learning was positively correlated with two forms of political 
participation: attending a campaign event and joining an organization (the relationship between 
learning and contacting an elected official and contributing money to a candidate was not 
statistically significant). 
 It is important to note that the researchers used the survey variable “learning from 
political comedy shows” as a proxy for “exposure from political comedy shows,” and measured 
only a few types of political participation within the context of an election.  They did not 
measure whether respondents were more or less likely to vote in an election or engage in a 
political protest—types of participation activities that may be relevant to the definitions of 
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citizenship in the current socio-political landscape.  The authors also caution that, although their 
findings challenge a major criticism of political comedy shows, they have yet to expose the 
causal mechanisms that relate exposure to participation.  They note that the correlations may 
reflect the potential of such shows to foster internal efficacy, induce concern, or create shared 
experiences among viewers (p.97).  Additionally, Fox, Koloen, and Sahin’s study (2007) 
suggests that the comic approach these programs have in presenting political information may 
have measurable psychological and physiological effects on the viewer.  There is evidence that 
the often negative portrayals of politicians by the broadcast media constitute “socially 
threatening information,” which may trigger the aversive system (p.223).  In contrast, the 
appetitive system is activated by the humor and laughter of The Daily Show.  Thus, the ways we 
enjoy and learn from political parody might be more fundamentally subconscious than we might 
assume and difficult to measure through self-reported survey data. 
 In an attempt to study the correlation between political comedy and political participation 
without arguing about what standard conclusions can be drawn from the construct of “political 
cynicism,” Young and Esralew (2011) looked directly at political behaviors during the 2004 
presidential primaries which they believed were particularly indicative of an engaged electorate 
and a healthy democracy: talking with others about why they should vote for a particular 
candidate; attending political meetings, speeches or rallies in support of a particular candidate; 
performing work for one of the candidates; giving money to a presidential campaign; or 
displaying campaign signs, stickers, or apparel (p.105).  Additionally, they measured forms of 
political discussion, including how many days they had engaged in discussions about politics 
with family and friends, people at work, or in public and private online forums.  Using two types 
of exposure (general late-night comedy and The Daily Show specific), they controlled for overall 
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candidate evaluation, party identification, political ideology, traditional political media exposure, 
interest in politics, civic knowledge, in addition to general demographic variables.  They 
concluded that exposure to The Daily Show was a significant positive predictor of political 
participation and political discussion, and that political knowledge was not a moderating factor.  
 Several studies have been conducted that attempt to show what sort of information or 
political knowledge is gleaned from comedy programs.  Many, such as the 2007 Pew Center 
survey, indicate that “regular viewers of The Daily Show and The Colbert Report were most 
likely to score in the highest percentile on knowledge of current affairs,” but the study leaves 
open the possibility that high level of knowledge among this population indicates they are likely 
to receive information from other sources in addition to the comedy programs.  People who 
enjoy and regularly watch The Daily Show may simply be more interested in political topics, and 
therefore are more informed compared to those who do not consume as much political news. 
 Xiaoxia Cao (2010) found that watching The Daily Show was positively associated with 
attentiveness to the issues that were frequently covered on the program (attentiveness being 
defined as ability “to recognize and selectively process information about a topic,” not only 
recognizing its existence, but motivating one to pay attention to additional information about the 
topic [p.30]).  Using theories of low-information rationality, she suggests that citizens rely on 
political information they glean from entertainment programs because “the effort spent in 
collecting large amounts of political information is not justified by the small chance that an 
individual may influence political outcomes” (p.30).  Therefore, she argues that The Daily Show 
appeals to politically apathetic people seeking entertainment, and that they, too, experience 
politically-positive effects though viewing.  
32 
 
 In this study, Cao used two national telephone surveys to examine the relationship 
between exposure to The Daily Show and attentiveness to the Afghanistan War in 2002 and to 
news about the candidates leading up to the 2004 presidential election.  The study controlled for 
exposure to a variety of traditional news sources, political knowledge, voting in past elections, 
strength of partisanship, and demographic variables such as education and income.  It was 
discovered that as many as 20 percent of the show’s viewers reported as being not inclined to 
follow politics, and in fact were not as interested in politics as consumers of traditional news 
sources.  However, these viewers experienced increased attention to the issues discussed 
frequently on the program, with the magnitude of the effect decreasing for those who are more 
politically attentive.  Cao suggests that, “it is people who seek entertaining shows that such 
programs tend to benefit in the current media environment,” in which the multiplicity of media 
choices have created a gap in knowledge and participation between politically apathetic people 
and political junkies (Prior, 2007) (p.42). 
 Communications researcher Barry A. Hollander (2005) used national survey data to 
support the hypothesis that consumption of comedy and late-night programs is associated with 
recognition of campaign information (rather than actual recall of such information), with age 
having a modest interaction with such effects.  The study’s methodical strategy emphasized the 
importance distinction between recognition and recall of campaign information in the study of 
knowledge acquisition and subsequent behavioral effects of political media, particularly among 
youth.  Because television is a passive medium that does not require a great amount of cognitive 
effort to consume, lack of critical engagement with the material likely leads to the ability to 
recognize information, but not remember the specific details.  He explains, “Late-night television 
viewing increases what young people think they know about a political campaign but provides at 
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best modest improvements to actual recall of events associated with the campaign” (p.411).  
Hollander cautions that such an effect may cause an audience to turn off mainstream news 
sources, leaving political comedy their only source of information.  Thus, the “knowledge” 
purported by many studies to increase with viewership of political comedy shows may not tell 
the entire story.  The question remains if what people are learning from such shows is enough to 
make them competent, motivated political participants.  
 Baumgartner and Morris (2011) argue that, whatever the effect of The Daily Show on 
attention or attitudes toward politics, “the contributions of TDS to the political engagement of 
young adults are negligible,” and the cynicism toward government and politics it presents has 
“potential negative effects on heavy viewers” (p.64).  In a survey-based study comparing the 
differences in exposure effects on heavy, moderate, casual, and non- viewers of The Daily Show, 
they noticed that heavy viewers were more likely to agree with the statement “Public officials 
don’t care much what people like me think” and disagree with the statement “I have faith the 
U.S. electoral system,” indicating an association between heavy viewing and greater levels of 
political cynicism.  
 The experimental and survey studies have been largely inconclusive in determining the 
real impacts of political satire on individual knowledge, attitudes, or behaviors, in part due to the 
difficulty of determining causal relationships, isolating variables, and operationalizing complex 
concepts.  Furthermore, the scope of study is very narrow, using nearly exclusively a young adult 
sample populations and exposure to The Daily Show as the independent variable.  What these 
studies do reveal, however, is the variety of ways mediated satirical messages can influence real-
world democratic functions, and provide a basis for the current study to extend the examination 
of political news parody and conceptions of citizenship.   
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CONCLUSION 
 The authority of the government and the news media to construct our social reality is 
becoming increasingly undermined, and news parody that targets the political realm is no doubt a 
contributing factor toward widespread institutional distrust among the nation’s populace.  
Political satire has historically played an important role in how people conceptualize their 
relation to the democratic process, and the current American socio-political landscape is a 
particularly poignant example.  
 The reviewed literature, taken as a whole, indicates that political parody is a burgeoning 
topic for researchers, extending across disciplines, from Communications and Media studies, to 
Political Science to Sociology.  In an age of declining political and institutional trust and 
growing popularity of political comedy shows, there is widespread interest in the purpose, 
agenda, style, and effects of such programs.  While many studies have attempted to measure the 
social-psychological effects of viewership on individuals, differences in theory, 
operationalization, and methods have yielded different conclusions.  It is difficult to determine 
how pervasive the observed effects are, what the mediating variables are, and what the causal 
relationship between variables is.  There is debate, within the academic sphere and larger society, 
as to whether shows of this type are harmful to democracy, or helpful. 
 Experimental studies have shown that exposure to The Daily Show increases political 
knowledge (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2007b), but many researchers 
(e.g. Hollander 2005) have expressed concern with measures of knowledge and the causal 
relationships pertaining to exposure and reception of information.  There is also evidence that 
political information presented as entertainment is one way to increase attentiveness to the world 
of politics, particularly among the politically apathetic (Cao 2010), and the use of humor is 
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conducive to positive feelings toward the topic being presented (Fox, Koloen, and Sahin 2007).  
As for attitudes, while there is no doubt that ironic cynicism reigns as the spirit of the parodic 
discourse, there is debate as to how the messages translate to audiences.  Some believe political 
satire may raise internal efficacy while simultaneously lowering external efficacy (Baumgartner 
and Morris 2006), while others (Cao and Brewer 2008; Baumgartner and Morris 2011) have 
argued whether such changes in attitude have any actual effect on behaviors of political 
participation.  
 As experimental and survey studies have begun to develop an understanding of the role 
of political parody for individuals, there is much research left to be done to place these media 
effects in the larger social context.  News media are tools that help us configure our social 
reality, determining what information the public hears every day, and from what point of view.  
The socializing nature of media, more generally, tells us what we should be concerned about and 
how we should respond. However, in a culture of increasing anti-intellectualism and anti-
authoritarianism, led by a generation that tends to ironically detach themselves from 
institutionalized structures (Van Heertrum 2011), the authority of journalists to create our reality 
in the frame of power relationships is being undermined.  In the wake of such journalistic 
scandals as Watergate, so-called objective, neutral journalism seems unworthy of shaping our 
reality.  But what are we to replace it with?  With so much information in the world, and our 
limited ability to gather and comprehend it, we rely on organizations with resources to do so for 
us.  When they lose credibility, however, it becomes almost inconsequential who we trust.  Fake 
news may be becoming just as influential to the construction of our reality as the “real” thing, 
and the delineation between the two types of programs seems less and less significant (McBeth 
and Clemons 2011).  
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  Many media critics and journalists (e.g. Schudson 1999) express admiration for the 
satirical take on news, arguing that Jon Stewart and the like are performing more valuable critical 
journalism than the traditional news media.  In their redefinitions of journalistic practices 
through discursive integration, they challenge the assumed authority of news media and urge 
them to devote their efforts more toward honesty and less toward spectacle. However, with the 
disclaimer that they are presenting “fake news,” the comedians are able to shirk journalistic 
conventions, such as objectivity and neutrality, without threat of libel.  In an interview with 
NPR, Jon Stewart (2004b) emphasized the difference between journalistic and comedic integrity 
in his work: “We don't fact-check [and] look at context because of any journalistic criteria that 
has to be met; we do that because jokes don't work when they're lies.  We fact-check so when we 
tell a joke, it hits you at sort of a gut level — not because we have a journalistic integrity, [but 
because] hopefully we have a comedic integrity that we don't want to violate." 
 Within this context of this media crisis, increasingly infused with a cynical and anti-
authoritarian public discourse, it is important to ask the question: what does it mean to be an 
American citizen in the postmodern democratic society, and who is best equipped to construct 
these definitions?  The next chapter will explore these questions and ask, what is the role of 
political news parody in developing and promoting a particular definition of citizenship? 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The literature reviewed above discusses the current climate of mainstream political 
journalism and the growing role of political news parody within the context of diminishing 
public trust in media and government.  It emphasizes the potential for entertainment programs 
such as The Daily Show, The Colbert Report or The Onion News Network to have a significant 
impact on the public perception of governing institutions, and on people’s understanding of their 
social positions relative to them.  The theoretical section of this study will begin with an 
assessment of the relationship between individuals and government with a focus on the crisis of 
political legitimation that has risen out of the modernization process.  The chapter will define to 
what extent political structures are legitimated through mediated public discourse and the effect 
of this discourse on cultural understandings of democratic citizenship.  The role of mass media in 
“colonizing” political discourse will be introduced, and will further suggest that political satire is 
an alternative discourse that functions to simultaneously critique media narratives and legitimate 
political structures.  Within this framework, this discussion will consider the theoretical function 
of news-style political parody in regards to defining citizenship for contemporary Americans.  It 
will ask if this type of political discourse is revolutionary or liberal in nature.  Ultimately, in 
examining the role of satirical discourse in our society, this study aims to discover whether this 
type of “alternative” discourse legitimizes or undermines political structures. 
 
REFLEXIVE MODERNITY AND THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMATION  
 We live in a fragmented, politically polarized society that is increasingly anti-
authoritarian and anti-intellectual.  Through industrialization and modernization, small, 
homogenous communities have given way to large, diverse and disconnected worlds; in this 
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process, the nature of political discourse has changed.  Subsequently, conceptions of citizenship 
have evolved.  Lacking frequent direct interaction with governing bodies or comprehensive 
understanding of socio-political structures, individuals in the modern era struggle to figure out 
how they fit into—and function as part of—a democratic society.  What has occurred in the 
attempt to rationalize the modern American political system is the adoption of doctrinal 
worldviews that frame political and social issues according to a set of beliefs rather than 
empirically-based comprehensions of social facts.  It is obvious when observing the political 
arena that polarization of beliefs effectively cripples many attempts at legislative action, 
particularly at the national level.   
  When presented to the public through a mediated lens, political partisanship further 
begets a cynical populace.  A sizable body of evidence indicates that today’s Americans doubt 
the efficacy of their government, the accuracy of their information sources, the intelligence of 
their neighbors, or their own ability to affect the system in any way.  The combination of 
polarized anti-intellectual discourse in political media and pervasive cynicism in the populous 
opens up a space for political satire to act as an appealing alternative discourse.  What The 
Onion, The Daily Show and The Colbert Report do best is to point out the absurdities and 
hypocrisies in government and in the media that reports on it.  Their use of irony in presenting 
political news to their audiences offers alternative conceptualizations of what these institutions 
stand for, and where we as citizens stand in relationship to them.  
  To define the modern era in which we use comedy as an alternative political discourse to 
the “objective” news media, I will look at how social theorists Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck 
describe modern reflexivity and new threats to political legitimation that did not exist in 
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traditional societies.  Their characterizations of contemporary society provide the foundation for 
the discussion of deliberative democracy, communicative action and citizenship.   
 According to Anthony Giddens, social action within modern society differs from 
traditional society in several key ways.  First, people have grown less concerned about the limits 
of social action as prescribed by custom or tradition.  Instead of claiming knowledge or 
legitimacy of facets of life based on cultural precedent, modern collectives are faced with a much 
broader range of choices, and therefore must engage in much more thorough consideration and 
analysis before action is taken.  Giddens (1990) argues that what he terms “the reflexive 
monitoring of action” is a necessary basic element of system reproduction in the modern era.  He 
explains, “The reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are 
constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very 
practices, thus constitutively altering their character” (1990:38).  
 Pervasive reflexivity alters peoples’ conceptions of knowledge and truth.  While 
traditional societies justified their beliefs and patterns of action by simply consulting the wisdom 
of previous generations, modern societies depend on groups of experts to discover and define 
information for the rest of society.  Giddens points out, however, that it is impossible to have 
complete trust in these supposed arbiters of knowledge, because every element of a knowledge 
system is left open for revision should new information be discovered.  He argues that this 
constant reflexivity is actually subversive to reason, which is understood as the acquisition of 
certain knowledge.  Because we are less assured of our culture’s ability to know anything for 
certain, we have come to have less faith in the natural sciences and the institutions that have 
traditionally held power.  
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 Ulrich Beck describes this undermining of knowledge institutions in his discussion of 
modernity as a “risk society.” Modern civilization, according to Beck (1992):   
had set out to remove ascriptions, to evolve privacy, and to free people from the 
constraints of nature and tradition, [and] there is thus emerging a new global ascription of 
risks, against which individual decisions hardly exist…The experience of this 
victimization by risks which is closed to decisions makes understandable much of the 
shock, the helpless rage and the ‘no future’ feelings with which many people react 
ambivalently and with necessarily exploitative criticism to the latest achievements of 
technical civilization. (P.41)  
 
Here, Beck identifies the conditions of life in a globalized and interdependent modern society as 
the root of cynical attitudes within the culture.  Institutional distrust stems from “systematic 
causes that coincide with the motor of progress and profit” (p. 40).  People, particularly those in 
leadership positions, are constantly questioning whether our historical conceptualization of social 
progress in the form of economic industrialization and scientific rationality are “still correct” (p. 
40).  The debates about the ideal future of society are contentious, and “take on the character of 
doctrinal struggles within civilization over the proper road for modernity” (p. 40).  For Beck, 
democratic citizenship has lost much of its authority to act in individuals’ independent interest. 
Instead, people vote in support of particular belief systems that bolster the authority of political 
actors or organizations.  The multiplicity and diversity of potential political wills among the 
United States population is reduced to a handful of ideologies corresponding to partisan 
platforms.  Party leaders assert their positions in opposition to the others by evoking risks and 
using conflictual rhetoric, creating in citizens feelings of helplessness because they cannot 
effectively assert their particular political will through the representative system of governance.    
 Thus, Giddens and Beck suggest that the fragmentation and polarization of contemporary 
society has left individuals without a trusted framework for understanding their social world.  As 
communities experience the breakdown of traditional forms of cohesion and methods of direct 
discourse, the question of legitimation becomes increasingly important.  How do we rationalize 
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our nation’s governing structures and come to see them as legitimate forces of social control?  In 
the American context, it has much to do with the notion of citizenship, the individual’s right and 
duty to elect representatives into the administration.  The following section will look more 
closely at the concept of democratic citizenship and its evolution over time.  As I will discuss, 
mediated political discourses, including satirical texts, have played a critical role in defining the 
concept and legitimizing it within contemporary society.  
 
DEFINING CITIZENSHIP 
 Citizenship, as a theoretical concept, is far from static.  Its definitive characteristics are 
historically and contextually specific, and sensitive to forces of political and ideological change.  
Much of the contemporary theoretical work on citizenship begins with British sociologist T.H. 
Marshall, who is considered central to debates regarding the complexities of the relationship 
between citizenship and the economic structure of capitalist society.  Although Marshall has 
been widely critiqued for ethnocentrism, as he considers citizenship only in the English case, 
Bryan S. Turner (1990) contends that his theory necessarily contains universalistic elements.  For 
example, he points out that the historical development of citizenship in many western societies 
“involves a transition from societies based on ascriptive criteria to societies based upon 
achievement criteria” (1990:194), such that the status of citizen is not confined to particular 
birthplaces or ethnicities, but hypothetically available to anyone who earns it by following 
established procedures.  The historical evolution of citizenship has been shaped in every society 
by political and cultural conflicts, and relies on a state institution to negotiate the contradictions 
between rights and freedoms.  According to Turner, Marshall’s seminal theory considers 
citizenship the primary political means for resolving “the contradiction between the formal 
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political equality of the franchise and the persistence of extensive social and economic 
inequality, ultimately rooted in the character of the capitalist marketplace and the existence of 
private property” (1990:191).  Defining citizenship, therefore, is a complex task, not only for 
scholars of the topic, but for every individual who considers themselves a citizen of a nation.  
 Changing definitions of American citizenship can be considered along the evolutionary 
trajectory theorized by Marshall (as described in Turner 1990:191).  The various models of 
citizenship described by Marshall relate closely to Jürgen Habermas’ (1998) conceptualizations 
of democracy.  In the eighteenth century when the nation was founded, Marshall argued that 
there was a particular emphasis on civil rights, which refer to the legal status of individuals, 
protection of their private interests from government intervention, and access to the legal system.  
In Habermas’ liberal understanding of democracy, society is seen as “a system of market-
structured interactions of private persons and their labor” (1998:239).  The government is a 
purely administrative organization whose function is to bind together private interests and use its 
political power to work toward collective goals.  In this model, “the citizen status is determined 
primarily by the individual rights he or she has vis-à-vis the state and other citizens…[and] 
individual rights are negative rights that guarantee a domain of freedom of choice within which 
legal persons are freed from external compulsion” (Habermas 1998:240).  In this view, citizens 
are politically passive; they are granted the opportunity to assert their private interests by electing 
members of government bodies and asserting their aggregate political will on the administration.  
Their primary political role is determining whether or not government exercises its authority in 
the interest of its citizens.   
 The next century, according to Marshall, was more broadly defined by struggles for 
political rights, referring to people’s equal access to parliamentary bodies via the electoral 
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system, which would enable them to articulate their interests (Turner 1990).  This historical trend 
relates to Habermas’ republican model of democracy, which considers politics as part of the 
socialization process, “the medium in which the members of quasi-natural solidarity 
communities become aware of their dependence on one another and, acting with full deliberation 
as citizens, further shape and develop existing relations of reciprocal recognition into an 
association of free and equal consociates under law” (1998:240).  Rather than freedom from 
external compulsion, these positive rights of citizenship guarantee the possibility of political 
participation, “through which the citizens make themselves into what they want to be – 
politically responsible subjects of a community of free and equal citizens” (1998:241).  
Citizenship in this sense emphasizes dutiful civic behavior, and an inclusive process of opinion- 
and will-formation in which legislative acts are designed to be in the equal interest of all.  This 
understanding of democratic citizenship requires a sphere of political discourse oriented toward a 
mutual understanding.  The expansion of mass media in the nineteenth century served this role 
and contributed to the changing nature of American citizenship from the liberal model (civil 
rights) to the republican model (political rights).   
 Finally, in the modern era, Marshall argues that capitalist democracies have turned their 
focus toward social rights, which are the foundation of the welfare system (Turner 1990).  This 
discussion takes place within Habermas’ third model of democracy called “deliberative politics,” 
which takes into greater consideration the pluralism and fragmentation of modern society.  
Although communicative discourse works to help individuals understand their position within a 
society and come to mutual agreements, there exists a multitude of underlying specific “interests 
and value-orientations that are by no means constitutive of the identity of the political 
community as a whole, that is, for the totality of an intersubjectively shared form of life” 
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(1998:245).  Not every political goal, thus, represents the entire community on which it might 
have an effect.  Therefore, political goals must be negotiated and compromises much be reached, 
while adhering to general moral principles that extend even beyond the legal community. 
Habermas asserts that, “Everything depends on the conditions of communication and the 
procedures that lend the institutionalized opinion- and will-formation their legitimating force” 
(1998:245). 
 In his analysis of the character of modern social membership and political participation, 
which considers Marshall’s theory in light of major critiques of his work, Turner (1990) 
developed a conceptual framework for comparing the definitions of citizenship between various 
western societies that synthesizes the analytical levels of individual citizen, the organization of 
social rights, and the context of institutional democracy.  His typology contains four ideal-type 
political contexts in which citizen rights are created and institutionalized.  These occur at the 
intersection of two aspects: first, citizen rights can be seen as either handed down from the state 
in return for pragmatic cooperation (“above”) or achieved as the outcome of a struggle by 
subordinate groups for benefits (“below”).  The other axis differentiates between the interaction 
of the individual and the state in either the “public” or “private” arena, referring to the notion that 
political action is motivated by either communal or individual interests.  The public sphere is 
defined by its concerns with inclusion and generality of interests (as opposed to particularity), 
and relies on the belief that all citizens must participate in political processes in order to achieve 
fair decisions and maintain communal bonds (Young 1995).  The private sphere incorporates 
individual and particular group interests, and employs group bargaining sessions as political 
procedure, rather than holding discussions inclusive of all who are potentially affected by 
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decisions (Young 1995).  Combinations of social perspectives on citizen rights and political 
space, therefore, constitute the variety of public discourse in western political traditions.   
 Within this typology, Turner classifies American liberalism as citizenship “from below” 
and centered in the “private space.”  He describes the American political discourse as a strong 
rejection of centralized power and centered on the rights and privileges of independent citizens.  
Due to a strong tradition of American individualism and a federal system tied to checks and 
balances, there is a weak tradition of social citizenship, as evidenced by the state’s limited and 
late-developing welfare system.  Although political discourse is increasingly happening within 
the public sphere, Turner argues, “To some extent the dominance of individualism and the value 
of personal success have meant that the ‘public arena’ is typically understood in terms of 
individual involvement in local voluntary associations” (1990:209).  Because citizenship is so 
particular and privatized, Young argues that that “interest group pluralism…institutionalizes and 
encourages egoistic, self-regarding view of political processes, one that sees parties entering the 
political competition for scarce goods and privileges only in order to maximize their own gain, 
and therefore they need not listen to or respond to the claims of others who have their own point 
of view” (2011:183).  Political discourse in contemporary America has indeed taken on the 
character of competing doctrinal worldviews as Giddens described, and has fundamentally 
altered ordinary Americans’ perceptions of citizenship.  
 The modern understanding of democratic citizenship is quite different from the one 
Alexis de Tocqueville observed nearly two hundred years ago and described in Democracy in 
America.  As Bellah et al. (1985) explain, the early-American township viewed politics as simply 
getting involved with one’s neighbors and reaching moral consensus within the community 
through face-to-face discussion.  Pluralism has since changed the meaning of politics to denote 
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the pursuit by different interest groups to gain strategic advantage, according to agreed-upon 
rules.  This climate has given rise to “professional politicians,” who represent interest groups and 
skillfully build alliances and engage in interest bargaining.  Ordinary Americans generally view 
“politics of interest” as negative, but also “a kind of necessary evil in a large, diverse society, as 
a reluctantly agreed-to second best to consensual democracy” (p.200).   Bellah et al. caution, 
however, that the public regard these proceedings as not entirely legitimate in the moral sense.  
Instead of developing public policy by means of community discussion and consensus-making 
(the democratic ideal), it is achieved through “competition among groups in which inequalities of 
power, influence, and moral probity become highly visible as determinants of the outcome” 
(pp.200-201).  The ordinary American is not capable of exercising influence in the highly 
complicated and adversarial realm of national politics.  Instead, the typical expression of 
individual political will is support for a candidate, and for many, participatory citizenship 
involves nothing more than casting the occasional ballot. 
 The above characterizations of modern American democracy as particular and 
discursively polarized present the primary conflict of citizenship in our society: people remain 
strongly individualistic and partial to their own economic interests, and often struggle to relate 
the ideal image of citizen to the large-scale political forces that shape their lives (Bellah et. al. 
1985:199).  Yet, the political discourse that Habermas (1989) argues is necessary for legitimating 
systems of government control has been colonized by the mass media, and turned formerly 
critical, politically active citizens into passive consumers of political information.  Television 
punditry and political debate has become something that we consume rather than participate in.  
It stands to reason, then, that media texts must actively construct a view of citizenship that 
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rationalizes public individuals as participants of self-interested group bargaining, as opposed to 
being active participants in community consensus-making. 
 In order to determine what sort of discourse is necessary for the democratic government 
to remain valid in the eyes of its citizens, I will consider Jürgen Habermas’ theories of 
communicative action and deliberative democracy, which suggest that political and legal 
arrangements are legitimated through the processes of debating them.  In the fragmented society, 
mass media narratives become the primary landscape in which deliberation occurs, including the 
reconciliation between traditional media narratives and the satirical discourses which stand next 
to and critique them.    
 
HABERMAS: COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND DELIBERATIVE DISCOURSE  
 There is no doubt that political discourse and ideas about citizenship have evolved as 
mass media has gained prominence in our daily lives. J.G. A. Pocock writes: 
 When a world of persons, actions, and things becomes a world of persons, 
actions, and linguistic or electronic constructs that have no authors, it clearly 
becomes much easier for the things—grown much more powerful because they 
are no longer real—to multiply and take charge, controlling, and determining 
persons and actions that no longer control, determine, or even produce them.  
Under these conditions of the information explosion, we have—since we are still 
under the imperatives of the classical ideal—to find means of affirming that we 
are citizens: that is, of affirming that we are persons and associating with other 
persons to have voice and action in the making of our worlds. (1995:52). 
 
 Jürgen Habermas (1984) argues that media have, in large part, taken over the role of 
knowledge-making and the reproduction of social systems.  In traditional societies, knowledge 
was woven directly into the fabric of community, rationalized and institutionalized through 
direct discussion with community members and leaders.  Political frameworks were created and 
understood directly by those under their jurisdiction.  In the modern era, however, direct 
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discourse is impossible due to the size and scope of the nation.  Discourse, by necessity, has 
become mediated and thus abstracted from the individual consciousness.  For the most part, 
national politics is no longer discussed between neighbors for, I would argue, two main reasons: 
a) the risk of offending people whose beliefs fall on opposite end of the doctrinal spectrum and 
b) due to the perception that the discussion will have no real effect on the society at large.  
However, political discourse thrives on television, radio, newspapers and internet forums, where 
political elites and media pundits monopolize the conversation according to their particular 
agenda.  As a result, citizens’ understanding of the political world is through a particular lens, 
one that is polarized and hyped in a persistently reflexive manner. 
 In his influential work “The Theory of Communicative Action,” Habermas (1984) argues 
that communication is the basis of social life, the means by which humans coordinate their 
activities and reproduce the conditions necessary for maintaining themselves as a species.  He 
writes that communicative action, as a mechanism for reproducing the lifeworld “in the semantic 
dimension,” performs the following functions:  
It secures a continuity of tradition and coherence of knowledge sufficient for daily 
practice…ensures that newly arising situations are connected up with existing conditions 
in the world in the dimension of social space: it takes care of coordinating actions by way 
of legitimately regulated interpersonal relations and stabilizes the identity of groups to an 
extent sufficient for everyday practices…ensures that newly arising situations are 
connected up with existing situations in the world in the dimension of historical time: it 
secures of succeeding generations the acquisition of generalized competences for action 
and sees to it that individual life histories are in harmony with collective forms of life 
(1984 Vol.2:140-1).  
 
Habermas provides situations, identifiable in modern American culture, where these three 
functions have failed (1984 Vol.2:140-1).  The first, which measures continuity and coherence of 
knowledge by the extent to which it is rationalized and validated, recognizes that disturbances in 
cultural reproduction results in the loss of valid interpretive schemes and a deficit of meaning 
which leads further to a crisis of legitimation.  When the stabilization of group identities is 
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difficult and solidarity among its members is weak, anomie and conflict arise between social 
actors.  Finally, when the socialization process fails for an individual, the actor lacks the ability 
to maintain the intersubjectivity of action situations, and is diagnosed with psychopathologies 
and subsequent feelings of alienation.  Institutionalized mass communication systems, such as 
contemporary journalism, often fail to provide collective and individual meaning or to 
effectively coordinate social action.  In this social condition, there is a space for political news 
parody, which mocks the type of communicative action it considers inadequate for performing 
this critical function, while simultaneously reifying the original form as a useful platform to 
debate civic concepts.    
 Habermas contends that communicative action is particularly crucial to the process of 
validating and legitimizing all aspects of the social and political world.  He writes that “a 
lifeworld can be regarded as rationalized to the extent that it permits interactions that are not 
guided by normatively ascribed agreement but—directly or indirectly—by communicatively 
achieved understanding” (1984 Vol.1:340).  However, the modern era is characterized by a 
“decentration of our understanding of the world and the differentiation of various universal 
validity claims” (1984 Vol.1:397).  Like Giddens and Beck, Habermas acknowledges that we can 
no longer rely on tradition alone to legitimize particular civic interpretations or to create 
collective understanding.  We require mass communication forms to help us make sense of our 
large, fragmented social world—even if we don’t always completely trust the media’s 
interpretation.  Mediated discourses are nevertheless rational, and therefore produce knowledge 
and conceptual frameworks of understanding for the majority of citizens.      
 To coordinate social understanding, Habermas argues that industrialized cultures have 
developed three spheres of differentiated knowledge systems and processes of learning (1984 
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Vol.1:340): (1) scientific enterprise, which deals with empirical-scientific problems according to 
internal standards of truth, independent from moral or theological doctrines; (2) artistic 
enterprise, which enacts a professional sphere of aesthetic criticism to mediate the reception of 
works of art to the public; and (3) professional intellectual enterprise, which deals with questions 
of ethics, political theory, and law.  Thus, knowledge production in today’s society is 
institutionalized and specialized, but occupies a much riskier role that is constantly under threat 
by differentiated lifestyles and the reflexivity of social action.  While journalism may be 
considered an industry of the professional-intellectual sphere, its claims to truth and knowledge 
are extremely vulnerable to criticism and debate, particularly in the sphere of public politics. 
Journalistic parody, however, falls more firmly in the sphere of artistic enterprise, mediating the 
reception of political information through a highly critical lens.  The satirists’ interpretation of 
reality is highly cynical in regards to governments’ political domination of private individuals 
and the media’s propagation of social knowledge.       
 Habermas’ proposed solution to the legitimation crisis is the model of “deliberative 
democracy,” in which both informal and legally institutionalized discursive procedures are also 
the primary processes by which political structures are legitimized.  The act of discussion and 
debate inherently supports the presumption that the outcomes are rational, and decided 
democratically.  In this model, the institutionalized processes of opinion- and will-formation are 
much more important to a person’s acceptance of political domination than is an understanding 
of the constitution of the state (Habermas 1998).  His theory works to explain the intersubjective 
communication processes within and between government bodies and informal public networks.  
It is in the debate between these two spheres of discussion that rational opinion- and will-
formation takes place concerning political issues.  The deliberative democracy model requires an 
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active public sphere of political communication, which consists of voluntary discussion among 
citizens who depend on expert information—often obtained via print and electronic media. 
Habermas believes that this “communicatively generated power is transformed into 
admistratively usable power” through elections and legislative rulings (1998:249).  Thus, not 
only is political discourse rational, it amalgamates political will of the masses in a 
communicative force that complements the two other main social forces: administrative power 
and economic power.  
 Habermas further contends that modern media have replaced language as the primary 
mechanism for coordinating social action, and have “steered” social action to adhere to 
purposefully rational, formalized frames of understanding.  In the western world, 
commercialized media is closely tied to capitalist and consumerist ideologies. Habermas explains 
this connection, writing that media “uncouple action from processes of reaching understanding 
and coordinate it via generalized instrumental values such as money and power” (1984 
Vol.1:342).  The links between the economic and administrative systems and the “lifeworld” are 
formally organized, and in fact regulated by law (1984).  Media, as an institution, therefore must 
simultaneously legitimize the legal order and earn legitimacy through it.  Under certain 
conditions of the modern capitalist society, Habermas explains, media “colonizes the lifeworld,” 
nearly completely taking over the responsibility of coordinating social understanding according 
to the tenets of capitalism.  The subsystems of the economy and the state are controlled by the 
media, who “intervene with monetary and bureaucratic means in the symbolic reproduction of 
the lifeworld” (1984 Vol.2:356).  The colonization of the lifeworld by the media occurs under 
four specific conditions which are observable in contemporary American society (1984 
Vol.2:356): 
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  (1) “When traditional forms of life are so far dismantled so that the structural 
components of the lifeworld (culture, society, and personality) have been differentiated to a great 
extent.”   As discussed above in regards to the work of Giddens and Beck, fragmentation and 
polarization are defining characteristics of modern society.  The breakdown of traditional social 
integration and direct democratic discourse presents a crisis of legitimation not only in regards to 
political structures, but also in determining what defines our culture and how we relate to our 
social environments.     
  (2) “When exchange relations between the subsystems [the formal economy and the 
state] and the lifeworld are regulated through differentiated roles,” for example, individuals 
serving as employees of  state-regulated workplaces, as private consumers, as “clients” to 
government bureaucracies, and as participants in the political legitimation process.  The links 
between individuals and the organizing structures of society are multiple and varied, but the 
modern system values citizens primarily for their economic contributions.     
  (3) “When the real abstractions that make available the labor power of the employed 
make possible the mobilization of the vote of the electorate are tolerated by those affected as a 
trade-off against social rewards (in terms of time and money)” and (4) “where these 
compensations are financed according to the welfare-state pattern from the gains of capitalist 
growth and are canalized into those roles in which, withdrawn from the world of work and the 
public sphere, privatized hopes for self-actualization and self-determination are primarily 
located, namely, in the roles of consumer and client.”  These two final conditions illuminate the 
key fact that structural realities of our society are masked in the way we view the relationship 
between economy and state.  In the public discussion of political issues, labor is abstracted, 
engaging individuals not as workers, but instead as clients and consumers of capitalism.  The 
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inequalities and misrepresentations inherent in this system are tolerated because of the supposed 
rewards we receive under capitalism: primarily the intangible notions of self-actualization and 
self-determination which are the ideological driving force behind the “American dream.”  
 Under these conditions, national media has taken over responsibility for our culture, our 
social integration, our sense of self, our exchange relations, and crafting motivations for 
individual political participation based on private interest.  It has hijacked political discourse, 
abstracting it from our real lived experiences and placing it in the context of particular narratives 
which mask structural issues, placate workers, and justify social inequalities.  Political 
legitimation still occurs communicatively, but in a realm essentially inaccessible to the majority 
of citizens.  We are consumers of political discourse rather than participants.  
 In this context, political satire may serve a variety of roles. It acts as an alternative 
discourse that plays off of the primary media narratives; it deconstructs them, and exposes them 
as mythic, and often counter to the real interest of the public in consideration of structural issues.  
On the other hand, it may be viewed as part of the media landscape in which deliberation of 
issues strengthens the legitimation of the very structures it pokes fun at.  The classification of 
satire is at the center of the current debate: can it be considered an active part of deliberative 
discourse that compensates for the legitimation failures of a mass communication system?  Or is 
it merely an artistic form of communication that represents the extreme of cultural cynicism?  A 
closer look at the politics of ironic discourse may provide further insight into the potential impact 
of news-style political parody on modern conceptions of political power and citizenship.  
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THE POLITICS OF IRONY 
 Linda Hutcheon, author of “Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony” argues that 
all irony is political because it necessarily “involves relations of power based in relations of 
communication” (1994:2).  If, as Habermas believes, public discourse is the core of political 
legitimation processes, then it is absolutely necessary to study ironic discourses and determine 
how they affect both citizens and the administration.  The satirist’ role is not easily defined; to 
say he or she belongs to a particular revolutionist agenda would be reductive.  Bakhtin’s analysis 
of medieval carnival—one of the earliest forms of parodic discourse—recognized that parody 
necessarily depends on established hierarchies of power and discursive conventions in order to 
break them.  The dialogic discourse of carnival symbolically grants the public power over their 
rulers, but only temporarily, and with awareness that it is merely “play.”  Satire challenges 
official discourses, but does not attempt to replace them (Achter 2008).  Such a view, when 
translated into the modern context, strips news-style political satire of its potential revolutionary 
power, and in fact suggests it functions to legitimate the current order.  By mocking political 
figures and journalistic conventions, it reinforces their importance as the topics we should be 
concerned with and the rhetorical style through which we absorb social information.  However, 
although Bakhtin did not believe satire was revolutionary, he viewed carnival as “an act of 
renewal and a regeneration of hope and new possibilities among people” (Achter 2008:282).  
This view is devoid of cynicism, yet not powerful enough to demand or effect change in the 
power structure.  Thus, satire is, as Achter describes, an “ambiguous response to a culture that 
may have become ossified, too monologic” (p.282).  A satirical critique of administrative 
absurdities has no direct effect on the system, yet it conceives of all who participate in the 
conversation as publically politically active.   
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 The ambiguity of ironic discourse, according to Hutcheon is embedded in the fact that it 
can serve a wide range of political interests, and can produce a variety of responses among 
audiences.  For some, there is a “withdrawal of emotion and distancing of oneself from the issue” 
while for others, irony provokes “emotionally charged and passionate engagement” (Hutcheon 
1994:15).   Moreover, there is a critical distinction between two types of ironic messages: one 
works constructively from within the existing system to articulate new positions and attempt to 
change political outcomes.  The other type takes an outsider’s point of view to target products of 
the system (rather than the system itself) in a more destructive, negativizing way (Hutcheon 
1994).  News parody, I would argue, works from within the system in the form of subversive 
irony, working off of dominant discourses and recognizing power hierarchies.  The authors of 
these media texts are reflexive and self-critical about its position of relative powerlessness. 
 In an interview with Rolling Stone magazine, Jon Stewart commented on the popularity 
of his show and Stephen Colbert’s, saying, “I’ve always thought that we were somewhat an 
expression of people’s dissatisfactions with the existing institutions, rather than our own 
success...Everyone overestimates the power of satire…In a lot of ways it’s a catharsis and a 
pressure valve.  But that’s the difference between being a revolutionary and a satirist” (Bates 
2011).  Stewart has always contended that his program is intended to be purely comedic 
entertainment, and should not be considered journalism or social activism.  Yet his passive view 
of his own work lacks an awareness of satire’s role in challenging and legitimating the 
government order in the age of deliberative democracy.  The complexities of ironic discourse 
may indeed have considerable effects on social understandings of citizenship and on the 
democratic system at large.    
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CONCLUSION 
 The theoretical basis of this study concerns the fragmented and polarized conditions of 
the modern society that have led to a crisis of legitimation and destabilized understandings of 
democratic citizenship.  The preceding discussion recognizes media as the primary platform for 
discursive democracy to take place, and asserts the significance of ironic discourses in 
relationships of power.  Given this foundation, it can be argued that news-style political satire, in 
the style Jon Stewart, Stephen Colbert and The Onion, represents Habermas’ ideal of deliberative 
discourse.  Their comedy serves as an alternative voice in the public discussion of political 
matters, which rationalizes the very existence of the United States government and the 
legitimacy of its policies.      
 However, several questions remain.  Do these programs encourage citizens to be 
participants or spectators?  Are they, like most politically-relevant media, designed for the 
consumption of information in a style more humorous and entertaining than traditional 
journalism, or do they function as critical part of the deliberative democracy, giving people an 
alternative lens through which to view the modern social situation?    
 Most importantly, this study attempts to address the tensions of defining citizenship in the 
age of mediated discourse.  What type of citizenship is promoted by political satire?  Does it 
represent freedom from oppression in the liberal model, in which we live private lives and 
consume political media which affirms our own beliefs and supports our personal interests?  Or 
is it a revolutionary citizenship, which effectively challenges the existing order in a public sphere 
and provokes political action?  The following qualitative and quantitative research will 
investigate the civic role of political satire in modern America.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
 To explore the effects of news-style political satire on attitudes about citizenship, I 
collected data using two separate but interrelated stages.  I first conducted a content analysis of 
media texts from The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion in order to determine what 
topics were being discussed, and what messages were being presented to audiences regarding 
citizenship.   The primary concern was whether or not these texts either explicitly or implicitly 
promoted a particular Habermasian model of citizenship through their satirical rhetoric.  I used 
these findings to develop a survey questionnaire that would attempt to measure the how 
respondents viewed the relationship between American citizens and their governing institutions.  
I ran statistical tests on the survey data to determine if there were patterns in the way that people 
who consumed political satire thought about citizenship compared to people who did not.  The 
following chapter will detail the data collection process for both of these stages.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 I chose to use a combination of content analysis and survey collection research methods 
primarily for the type of information that could be collected from these two types of 
investigation. A systematic analysis of the relevant media texts allows the researcher to infer 
what messages are being sent to a mass audience, as well as the possible influences these 
messages might have on their receivers.  As Ole R. Holsti (1969) explained, one of the principle 
purposes of content analysis is “to make inferences as to the effects of communication (the 
decoding process) upon the recipient” (p.35).  Because the research question is primarily 
concerned with latent content (the underlying civic messages that satirical news promotes), this 
step was important in establishing what type of citizenship model is reinforced through these 
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texts.  From there, I was able to hypothesize how engagement with this type of media might 
affect the attitudes of its viewers. More practically, content analysis allows for descriptive data to 
be collected unobtrusively, fairly simply, and at a low financial cost to the researcher.  
 The use of survey data in the study’s second phase allowed for the examination of media 
consumption habits and civic attitudes of the American electorate by accessing a fairly large, 
reliable sample.  Using the survey method of data collection through an online task distribution 
resource allowed for the study to move beyond the geographical and time limitations of 
experimental or interview methods.  A large sample that pulled from a national audience was 
required for this study in order to be able to make generalizable assertions about the influence of 
satirical media messages on a mass audience.   
 A primary critique of survey data collection techniques is their inherent weaknesses in 
validity.  The complex attitudinal and behavioral concepts which comprise the dependent 
variables in this study are difficult to capture in a standardized questionnaire.  Although careful 
operationalization was employed to construct quality survey questions, it is important to 
recognize that the survey design is weak in concept validity, but strong in reliability.  Multiple 
measures were used to capture the various dimensions of the term “citizenship” while retaining 
applicability for a diverse population.      
   
CONCEPTUALIZATION 
 The construct of “citizenship” is conceptualized for this study through the use of Jürgen 
Habermas’ three theoretical models, which distinguish between “liberal,” “republican,” and 
“deliberative” views of citizenship.  Indicators of “liberal” citizenship include support for the 
ideas of economic/fiscal conservatism, limited government in exchange for expanded individual 
59 
 
rights, a limited social safety net, and an emphasis on individualism over community welfare.  In 
the context of elections, voting would be viewed as a form of resistance to a government that has 
become overbearing or threatening to individual liberties, and the act of voting would be 
referenced as a constitutional right granted to individuals of a certain legal status.  The liberal 
view is sometimes described as the “freedom from” model, in which political rights are negative 
rights and abstinence from participation is considered a valid option.  A vote is considered an 
indication of approval for a person or program, which when combined with the approving 
choices of others, licenses the administration with a particular power.   
 In contrast, the “republican” model of citizenship frames political rights as positive 
liberties that, although representative of autonomous choices, are also symbolic of the 
connections the individuals of a society have with one another.  There is an emphasis on 
inclusion and active interest in each others’ enfranchisement.  The republican perspective 
advocates for an adequate social safety net—a system that would require heavy taxation of the 
nation’s wealthy to support the poor.  The act of voting is considered an important responsibility 
of the citizen, and should be leveraged to ensure that everyone is protected equally under the law. 
Voting may be described within this model as a display of communal behavior, in which people 
are inclined to support measures that improve the well-being of everybody within the society 
rather than their particular interests.  There is an important discursive element to the process of 
decision-making, in which acts of deliberation are a chance for every participant to communicate 
their interests in order to arrive at a comprehensive model of what is best for the community.  A 
vote “represents a pooling of judgments” (Habermas, 1998, p.244) based on a mutual 
understanding of every position.    
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 Finally, Habermas’ alternative model of “deliberative” citizenship emphasizes the 
negotiation process of democratic decision-making, and calls for the institutionalization of the 
discursive procedures of the republican model.  However, rather than assuming people make 
voting decisions based on thorough consideration of all positions or according to a purely 
individual motivation, this model suggests that opinion-formation occurs through informal public 
networks.  Rather than making the distinctions between particular versus communal interests or 
the rights versus responsibilities of citizens, deliberative citizenship instead promotes political 
engagement, debate, and participatory discourse within informal networks, with the assumption 
that the negotiation of competing interests will eventually lead to a rational, legitimate system of 
governance.  A vote, in this view, is the exercise of an individual opinion, influenced by public 
communication, which is transformed by the administration into public policy. 
 As described in the previous chapter, these models of citizenship must be evaluated 
within the context of media colonization of communicative action.  Political mass media texts in 
general are important socializing tools Americans use to understand their relationship to the 
government and their role as citizens (Davis 1992).  According to Habermas, the ways in which 
the news media discuss and frame political issues abstracts the political process from the 
ordinary American’s personal experience.  With the public sphere increasingly mediated—and 
with polarized voices claiming to have the “correct” doctrinal worldview—democratic 
citizenship becomes less participatory.  It has been argued that media texts construct and 
rationalize a view of citizenship that is passive, private, self-interested, and cynical (Schudson 
1999; Cappella and Jamieson 1997).  The role of satirical discourses in constructing worldviews 
is more ambiguous, and the way in which these popular texts define citizenship is less clear.  
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Using the concepts of Habermas’ normative models of citizenship, I aimed to identify which 
definition was present in satirical texts, and in the attitudes of survey respondents.  
 
OPERATIONALIZATION 
 To determine which model of citizenship was being promoted by the media texts and 
which model the survey respondents identified most closely with, two types of measures were 
examined: behavioral and attitudinal.  Behavioral displays of citizenship comprise of reported 
degrees of participation in civic activities and engagement in political issues.  Media messages 
may encourage viewers to vote, to take activist roles, or simply just to pay attention and to think 
critically about current issues.  Comedic satire has been shown to direct attention to and increase 
engagement with particular issues (Cao 2010), although the behavioral implications are less clear 
(see Cao and Brewer 2008; Baumgartner and Morris 2011).   
 To measure political behavior, respondents were asked if they had registered to vote in 
the 2012 election, and if they actually did vote for United States president, members of Congress, 
or social issues on the ballot (questions 6-9).  They were also asked how often they participated 
in the following activities (question 15): discussing or debating political matters with family or 
friends; discussing or debating political matters in an online forum; reading books or in-depth 
articles on political figures or political issues; watching televised political debates; volunteering 
for political campaigns; and participating in political protests.  Finally, they were asked to self-
rate their level of political engagement (question 14).  The survey items were designed to expose 
both active and passive engagement behaviors.    
 Perhaps more illustrative of civic conceptions, however, are attitudinal measures.  Based 
on the differences between the Habermasian models of liberal, republican, and deliberative 
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citizenship, I questioned how people might have rated the relative worth of rights versus 
responsibilities in their definition of citizenship, and additionally discover what those particular 
rights and responsibilities might be.  Survey respondents were asked to rate how important they 
thought it was for a “good citizen” to do the following things (question 20): always vote in 
elections; stay informed on current political and community issues; help people in the 
community who have fewer resources; serve in the military; always obey laws; protect personal 
rights; serve jury duty; and pay taxes.   In addition, respondents were asked to provide their own 
definitions of citizenship (question 19).  Answers to this item were coded based on the same 
coding criteria used in the content analysis: whether the emphasis was on individual rights or 
responsibilities, or else a focus on the legal or social dimension of the concept.   
 Attitudes of cynicism were also important to this part of the study, as the ironic rhetoric 
of political satire has been shown to affect levels institutional trust and feelings of efficacy 
(Baumgartner and Morris 2006 and 2011).  To measure the perceived health of the relationship 
between the government and the individual, survey respondents were asked to rate how much 
confidence they had in the groups of people running the national press, their local press, the 
federal executive branch, the federal legislative branch, and their local government (question 17). 
Efficacy was measured by how strongly they agreed with the following statements (question 18): 
U.S. citizens are able to influence national public policy; U.S. citizens are able to influence local 
public policy; the political process is controlled by elites; political discourse is dominated by the 
mass media; my voice matters in the political conversation.  Together, behavioral and attitudinal 
indicators of civic thought were analyzed to discover how political satire texts and Americans 
defined the complex notion of citizenship.   
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CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 The first phase of data collection was a content analysis of popular, mainstream satirical 
texts on the topic of American electoral politics.  To best capture the potential influence of satire 
on viewer behavior and attitude, the analysis chose from texts released in the days leading up to 
the 2012 election when there was likely to be increased attention on citizen participation 
(primarily in the form of voting).   For both The Daily Show and The Colbert Report, the unit of 
analysis was an episode clip, a 1 ½ to 7-minute segment of the show covering a single topic. For 
The Onion, a self-contained article or video was the unit of analysis.  Video clips and articles 
were accessed through the franchises’ respective websites.3  The sample consisted of 20 clips 
from The Daily Show, 20 clips from The Colbert Report, and 20 items from The Onion, for a 
total of sixty cases. To create a sampling frame, I first listed every relevant clip from the Comedy 
Central programs that aired from the time frame of October 8, 2012 through November 6, 2012 
(a total of 15 episodes each).  It is important to note that this list excluded interview segments 
and clips that were not topically focused on politics.  Interviews stray from the parodic style of 
the rest of the show, and therefore are not the focus of this research.  While the vast majority of 
remaining clips were about political topics, six clips from The Colbert Report were eliminated 
that spotlighted entertainment or cultural topics that were not relevant to the discussion of 
politics.  The sampling frame for The Onion listed every piece of content (videos and articles) 
between October 8, 2012 and November 6, 2012 tagged under “politics.”  The sampling frame 
consisted of 171 total units (49 from The Daily Show, 44 from The Colbert Report, and 78 from 
The Onion.)  Twenty samples from each program were chosen at random using Excel’s random 
sampling function. 
                                                          
3
 www.thedailyshow.com; www.colbertnation.com; www.theonion.com  
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 Next, to analyze the data, I examined every video clip and article in the sample and coded 
it by topic.  The coding frame was developed using a primarily inductive method.  After viewing 
all the samples, a list of common topics was developed.  These topics centered around three 
primary categories: the campaign itself, issues relevant within the campaign, and the relationship 
of citizens to the campaign (primarily in the form of voters).  A second phase of analysis was 
done on each clip, in which the researcher identified the message that was being delivered.  This 
involved different strategies for each program; for example, in The Daily Show, Jon Stewart or 
his correspondents often ended the segment with a straightforward message that expressed a 
morality about the subject matter and the state of the nation more broadly.  Stephen Colbert and 
The Onion, on the other hand, utilized heavy sarcasm; in such cases, the moral message was 
taken to be the opposite of what he said. Ultimately, the coding of the data was subject to the 
researcher’s judgment.  In a final step of analysis, the moral message was considered within the 
theoretical framework of Habermas’ three models of citizenship, and coded accordingly.  Units 
were coded as “liberal” if they were based on constitutional rights or citizenship as a legal status, 
or characterized citizens as private, self-interested, or having a “freedom-from-external-
compulsion” attitude.   Clips were labeled “republican” if they focused instead on civic 
responsibilities or communal welfare, or suggested that citizenship entailed a “freedom-to-act” 
attitude.  Portrayals that emphasized the communicatively generated power of individuals were 
coded as “deliberative citizenship.”  However, because this ideal type is only feasible in a 
context where discursive procedures have been institutionalized, there exists a clear conflict in 
the real context of media colonization.  Deliberative procedures have all but disappeared from 
the national political process, but not without critique.  Many units were coded, therefore, as “a 
critique of media colonization,” which identified in the ways that the political conversation is 
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abstracted from the individual by portraying them as ill-informed, easily manipulated, or not 
interested in politics.  This may be considered an advocate for a shift toward deliberative 
democracy.  Finally, units that did not appear to present a particular view of citizenship were 
coded as “neutral.”  
 
SURVEY COLLECTION 
 A survey was conducted to test if there existed a correlation between frequent viewing of 
The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, or The Onion and conceptions about citizenship.  The 
surveys questionnaires were distributed via Amazon Mechanical Turk, a program that distributes 
small tasks to anonymous “workers” for small compensation. Ross, Irani, Zaldivar, and 
Tomlinson (2010) conducted a study that determined that the population of MTurk workers are 
“diverse across several notable demographic dimensions such as age, gender, and income, but 
[are] not precisely representative of the U.S. as a whole,” citing such factors as education level 
and nationality to be more homogenous than desired by many researchers.  Additionally, because 
this system requires Internet access and English language skills, “Compared to the entire 
population, MTurk workers from the U.S. are younger (median age 30 vs. 36.6), much more 
highly educated (63% vs. 25% with college degrees), and include a significantly greater number 
of female members (69% vs. 51%). Turkers also tend towards lower levels of annual income.”  
These demographic concerns were taken into consideration during the construction of this 
study’s survey.  For control purposes, then, demographic information was collected from each 
respondent (age, gender, education level, race, citizenship status).   
 Tasks on MTurk are distributed in the form of an HIT (“Human Intelligence Task”), 
where a description of the survey is posted on the site for workers to choose from among other 
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tasks by various requesters.  Workers who selected my task were given a link that directed them 
to my survey on SurveyGizmo.com.  After completion of the survey, workers returned to MTurk 
to close the HIT using the same five-digit code entered on the survey site.  If their survey 
responses were approved (I checked each one for completeness and indications of thoughtfulness 
of answers), they would receive the stated compensation (between $0.15-$0.25). 
 Data from the surveys was collected through SurveyGizmo.com, and converted to an 
SPSS data set.  I then several statistical tests on the data set, which are discussed in the following 
chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 The political satirist occupies a unique position within the existing newsmaking system, a 
position that demands both adherence to certain journalistic conventions and detachment from 
the forces that construct Americans’ political reality.  These comedians must comment on topical 
content in a manner familiar to audiences, but provide alternative interpretations that challenge 
the status quo.  American citizenship, a compound and malleable concept, might be undergoing 
renegotiation within these carnivalesque spaces.  In order to form concrete hypotheses about how 
political satire viewership might affect individuals’ worldview, I examined popular satirical 
texts, asking, what is the definition of citizenship being promoted by contemporary news 
parody?  For this investigation, I sought to identify which of Jürgen Habermas’ three models of 
citizenship (liberal, republican, or deliberative) was predominant within the satirists’ messages. 
This section will introduce and explain my findings regarding the topical content of sixty news 
parody cases.    
 Table 1 summarizes the Habermasian model of citizenship represented within these sixty 
media texts:   
Table 1. Models of Citizenship in Satirical Texts 
Type of Citizenship The Daily 
Show (n=20) 
The Colbert 
Report (n=20) 
The Onion 
(n=20) 
Total  
(n=60) 
Percentage 
of Total  
Liberal  0 5 1 6 10.0% 
Republican 4 5 5 14 23.3% 
Deliberative 0 0 0 0 0.00% 
Neutral 7 5 6 18 30.0% 
Media colonization 9 5 8 22 36.6% 
 
Approximately one-third of the content offered up a view of citizenship according to one of the 
three Habermasian models (the rest either remaining neutral or focusing on media colonization 
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and the lack of deliberative democratic space).  Of these, only 30% (10% of the total units) 
referred to citizenship in a liberal sense.  The legal status of citizens was considered only in 
relation to voting rights that need to be protected against various attempts at disenfranchisement.  
The expectation that citizens should be private or self-interested was never presented.  In 
contrast, there was more frequent evidence of the notion of citizens having particular 
responsibilities toward their fellow Americans—most often articulated in the form of voting 
(voter responsibility was a topic in 10% of total clips).   
 The majority of the satire units that depicted a Habermasian model were found to be 
republican, comprising 23.2% of the total clips.  Such a model incorporated a variety of 
politicized stances regarding civic duty.  On separate occasions, Stephen Colbert stressed the 
importance of affirmative action (Oct. 16, 2012), an adequate social safety net to help victims of 
disaster (Oct. 31, 2012), increased taxation of the wealthy to contribute to the welfare system 
(Oct. 8, 2012), and the potential destructiveness of voting on the basis of particular interests 
(Oct. 31, 2012).  Colbert, who takes on the persona of a conservative pundit to make his point 
utilizing heavy-handed sarcasm, frequently highlights the destructiveness of ideologies that 
benefit members of the privileged class (wealthy white males like himself).  His recognition of 
systemic economic and social inequalities leads many of his comedic statements to be classified 
as republican.  However, it is interesting to note that The Colbert Report registered the highest 
occurrence of liberal units (five).  Each of these segments defended a citizen’s legal right to vote 
in the face of disenfranchisement, and in once instance, defended the right to abstain from 
voting.  Yet, the theme of civic responsibility proved to be a stronger message from Stephen 
Colbert than did the protection of individual rights.      
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 Meanwhile, The Onion explored the deleterious social effects of the liberal philosophy of 
viewing elections as a system of marketplace interactions.  One news brief under the headline 
“Increased Negative Campaigning Reveals Previously Hidden Ugly Side of Politics” 
(http://www.theonion.com/articles/increased-negative-campaigning-reveals-previously,30182/) 
commented that the financial contributions of voters to political campaigns are often used to fund 
attack ads and further the development of anti-intellectual and irrational modes of political 
discourse.  Similar to The Colbert Report, The Onion provided a liberal interpretation of 
citizenship only to invoke voting rights in a defense against voter disenfranchisement.  The real 
essence of citizenship, therefore, lies in recognizing flaws in political and social systems which 
promote anti-intellectualism and inequality.             
 Table 2 presents the distribution of sub-topics found in the satirical texts that related to 
the campaign.  The results highlight the comedians’ intense focus on the relationship between 
mass media and political campaigning.  
Table 2. Campaign-Related Topics in Satirical Texts 
Campaign-Related  
Sub-topics  
The Daily 
Show (n=20) 
The Colbert 
Report 
(n=20) 
The Onion 
(n=20) 
Total 
(n=60) 
Percentage 
of Total 
Presidential politics 18 15 16 49 82.0% 
Congressional politics 1 2 2 5 8.3% 
Televised debate 9 2 8 19 31.7% 
Media spectacle 7 8 9 24 40.0% 
Media partisanship 9 8 2 19 31.7% 
Campaign funding/spending 2 1 2 5 8.3% 
Negative campaigning 3 0 2 5 8.3% 
Rhetorical hypocrisy 5 2 2 9 15.0% 
Bribery/corruption 0 2 1 3 5.0% 
Conspiracy theories 0 6 0 6 10.0% 
Anti-intellectualism 3 4 2 9 15.0% 
Political partisanship 7 2 1 10 16.7% 
 
 It is unsurprising that, in the close proximity to the presidential election, 82% of the 
parody units were on the topic of presidential politics—defined here as the strategic process of 
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getting a candidate elected to the office of the presidency by influencing the minds of the 
electorate.  In the contemporary context, presidential politics involves a complex relationship 
between politicians, mass media, and voters, which accounts for the high incidence of media-
centric topics identified in the satire.  Significantly, 40% of total clips were about media 
spectacle—the use of political discourse as a commodity (a source of profit) rather than as a tool 
for rational decision-making.  Although The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion sit 
alongside mainstream media programs, they offer up a heavy skepticism of the mass media’s 
role in constructing Americans’ political and civic reality.  News parody programs engage in 
“hypermediation” tactics that encourage viewers to scrutinize the source of information, and by 
extension, the gatekeeping and mediation activities of the journalism industry (McKain 
2005:417).  
 By frequently mocking the spectacle-making activities of the mass media and pointing 
out the consequences of their “style over substance” folly, satirical programs bring awareness to 
the ways in which political analysis gets reduced to a superficial discussion of candidates’ 
demeanor or gaffes at the expense of debate on important policy issues.  In one example, a 
newsbite-length Onion news item parodied the gratuitous attention given to a politician’s public 
performance.  Under the headline, “Biden's Handlers Suggesting He Forget the Words ‘Pink’ and 
‘Stink’ Altogether” (http://www.theonion.com/articles/bidens-handlers-suggesting-he-forget-the-
words-pin,29870/?ref=auto), the piece described political experts giving some ridiculous-
sounding advice to Joe Biden in preparation for the Vice Presidential debate in October.  The 
Onion did not simply joke how important it is for a politician to have a good media image (a 
universally understood political reality).  By presenting the situation in parodic form, it faulted 
the mainstream media for reflexively and compulsively discussing the importance of media 
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image, and thereby making it that much more important relative to the actual issues of the 
candidates’ debate.        
 In addition to problematizing the media’s spectacle-making, satirical discourses take 
issue with news outlets’ increasing partisanship.  Nearly one-third of the clips portrayed the mass 
media as heavily partisan, and the political information they present as tainted by the media 
corporations’ ideological agenda.  Fox News is the most heavily criticized news outlet in the 
Comedy Central programs, accused by Jon Stewart of spinning their analysis in support of the 
GOP, and mocked by Stephen Colbert for advancing political conspiracy theories.  Both 
comedians frequently criticize conservative pundits for acting petty and immature when they are 
clearly on the losing end of an argument.  In one example, The Daily Show presented a montage 
of Fox News clips airing in the wake of the second presidential debate showing various 
conservative pundits accusing the moderator of giving President Obama three extra minutes on 
the floor, selecting questions that were “pro-Obama,” and assisting the President by fact-
checking in the middle of the debate.  After the clips, Stewart jokes in a soft paternal voice “Let 
them cry themselves to sleep. It’s the only way they’ll learn” (Oct. 17, 2012).  He plainly 
suggests here that media partisanship promotes childish and anti-intellectual approaches to 
political discourse—a problematic condition when the public uses such narratives to construct 
their social reality.      
 To the satirists, media partisanship is further problematic because it plays up a false 
narrative that suggests the entire country is deeply and fundamentally partisan.  While 16.7% of 
the clips discussed the partisanship of the United States government (a condition that is not 
disputed), a similarly sizable percentage (18.3%) questioned the assumption that the electorate is 
as ideologically divided as professional politicians (see Table 3).  In one particular Colbert 
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Report segment, the fake newsman mocked the journalists who recoiled against statistician Nate 
Silver’s prediction that Obama had an 86% chance of defeating Mitt Romney (Nov. 5, 2012).  
Pundits ostracized Silvers’ empirical analysis because it challenged the “agreed-upon narrative” 
that the election would be “razor tight” (a narrative that ensured consumer interest in their 
product).  By mocking the media’s failure to accept empirical facts about the electorate, Colbert 
here illuminates the ways in which the news tries to actively construct our reality by telling 
viewers what they and their neighbors believe, and how this “reality” is empirically false.   
 Compared to discussions of politics and citizenship, criticisms of media colonization 
dominated the satirists’ discourse, comprising 36.6% of the clips analyzed (see Table 1).  This is 
likely a function of the programs’ parodic structure, which makes the network and cable news an 
easy target.  An overarching theme is that the media is harmful to democracy when it takes 
discursive power away from the American people.  In this way, Stewart, Colbert, and The Onion 
can be viewed as believers in a discursive democracy ideal, who endeavor to take away the 
influence of journalists and pundits through comedic delegitimation.  However, although 
deliberative democracy may be the logical opposite of media colonization, there are zero 
occurrences in the surveyed clips that actively and directly promote deliberative citizenship.  
They prefer to talk about national politics as a mediated field of competing worldviews, rather 
than as a collective of individuals, each endowed with communicative power.  
 Table 3 shows a distribution of sub-topics related broad national political issues—
theoretically, the topics that are discussed by candidates.  Notably, these issues are less prevalent 
in the satirical texts, and often take a back seat to discussions of media and the campaign.   
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Table 3. Political Issues Topics in Satirical Texts 
Political Issues 
Sub-topics 
The Daily 
Show (n=20) 
The Colbert 
Report (n=20) 
The Onion 
(n=20) 
Total  
(n=60) 
Percentage 
of Total 
Religion 2 1 2 5 8.3% 
Sexual morality 1 2 5 8 13.3% 
Domestic economy 5 2 3 9 15.0% 
Foreign Policy 5 1 1 7 11.7% 
Healthcare 0 0 1 1 1.7% 
Natural disaster aid 0 2 1 3 5.0% 
 
 The domestic economy was the most frequently discussed topic, followed closely by 
sexual morality (which included issues of abortion, adultery, and women’s sexual health).  These 
are, not surprisingly, some of the more polarizing topics of the campaign, highly representative 
of party divisiveness.  The satirists point out that, among traditional journalists, there is little 
discussion of moderate or alternative positions on any of these topics.  
 Table 4 shows sub-topics directly related to citizenship and voters, and how often they 
occurred in the observed sample.  
Table 4. Citizenship and Voter Topics in Satirical Texts 
Citizen and Voter  
Sub-topics 
The Daily 
Show (n=20) 
The Colbert 
Report 
(n=20) 
The Onion 
(n=20) 
Total  
(n=60) 
Percentage 
of Total 
Citizen Partisanship 5 4 2 11 18.3% 
Voter disenfranchisement 0 2 1 3 5.0% 
Voter rights 0 4 1 5 8.0% 
Voter responsibilities 3 1 2 6 10.0% 
Citizen voices 4 1 5 10 17.0% 
Public opinion 3 3 3 9 15.0% 
Voter demographics 2 5 1 8 13.3.% 
Racial minorities 1 1 1 3 5.0% 
  
Only 17% of the satirical clips allowed for the voices of everyday citizens to be featured.  
Notably in this sample, The Daily Show presented three comical interviews with groups of 
potential voters.  In each of these segments, however, their source of democratic power was not 
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in their ability to debate and communicate their desires for the future of the nation.  Their 
“voice” was reduced to a bubble on a ballot—and only as it pertained to their vote for president.  
Their individual views on political issues were channeled into a dichotomous choice: which 
candidate shared their opinion and would “best” represent their interests.  Furthermore, citizens 
were regularly lumped into demographic voting blocs—as if their choice for president was 
predetermined by their race, gender, or religion.  Thus, news parodies sometimes fall victim to 
the same conventions of real news narratives, and reify the unequal communicative relationship 
between politicians, media, and citizens.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS CONSTRUCTION  
 Despite the degree to which The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion 
lampoon the media’s passive treatment of citizens in relation to political decision-making, they 
do little to promote a solution by encouraging people to rejoin the national conversation and 
channel their communicative power into their governing bodies.  They endeavor to delegitimize 
journalists’ communicative authority, but they don’t in turn attempt to legitimize the 
communicative power of the people.  This conclusion can perhaps be countered by rhetorical 
evidence in Stewart and Colbert’s “Rally to Restore Sanity and/or Fear,” which aimed to provide 
a venue for everyday citizens to speak out against the communicatively controlling forces of the 
polarized mass media.  While the discourse surrounding that event in 2010 clearly favored a 
move toward deliberative democracy, the same cannot be said of the shows’ content as it 
pertained to the 2012 presidential election.  Stewart and Colbert failed to let individual citizen 
voices be heard to any significant degree in the lead-up to the election.  Perhaps the satirists view 
the media as too ossified of an institution and too effective at colonizing the conversation when it 
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comes to national elections.  Or, perhaps, they recognize their own dependence on the media as it 
currently stands; the loss of media spectacle would devalue their own product.  Their moral 
philosophical leanings may be outweighed by their desire to make good comedy.     
 Elections are often framed as opportunities for citizens to reinforce or redefine the values 
they want to see promoted at a national level.  Satirists impress to viewers the importance of 
critical examination of their sources of political information, and give them strategies for 
developing rational conclusions about whom they chose to elect to represent them in 
government.  They indicate that good citizenship involves being aware of how the media has 
colonized the political conversation and challenging their assumptions, narratives, and 
persuasion tactics through gatekeeping and misinformation.  It also involves making responsible 
decisions with your voting power.  Ultimately, these satirists suggest that is okay to opt out of 
the political process if you find it too inaccessible or corrupt.  They imply that, in some cases, the 
circumstances of polarity, stalemate, anti-intellectualism, negative campaigning, or elitism are 
too entrenched to be changed by voters, who already feel detached from the political process as 
spectators of media spectacle rather than participants.    
 The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion tend to present a low-efficacy, low-
trust, republican view of citizenship.  Based on these conclusions, I developed the following 
research hypotheses regarding the relationship between regular consumption of political satire 
and civic attitudes:  
 H1: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit lower levels of external efficacy 
compared to non-consumers.  
 H2: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit lower levels of trust toward 
governing and media institutions than non-consumers.  
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 H3: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit more “republican” definitions of 
citizenship, in the Habermasian sense, compared to non-consumers.  
These hypotheses were tested using the data collected from survey questionnaires, taken from a 
national sample.  
 
SURVEY COLLECTION  
 210 individuals completed the online survey on SurveyGizmo.com, having accepted it as 
a task through Amazon mTurk.  Demographic data shows that the sample is fairly evenly 
distributed among a variety of variables, but slightly skewed from the national population in 
ways predicted by Ross, Irani, Zaldivar, and Tomlinson (2010).  Respondents tended to be 
younger (Chart 1), concentrated in the 25-34 age range (36.7%).  24.3% were between the ages 
of 18-24, 28.6% were between the ages of 35-54, while only 10% were over the age of 55.  The 
sample contained slightly more females than males (51.7% to 49.3%).  The majority of 
respondents reported their race as white (81.4%), followed by 9.1% Asian, 6.7% Black, 3.8% 
Latino, and 1% Other (Chart 2). 
Chart 1. Age Distribution of Survey Respondents 
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Chart 2. Race Distribution of Survey Respondents 
 
 The sample is more highly educated than the U.S. population, with the majority having 
attended at least some college.  Over half of respondents hold a college degree (40% have a 
bachelor’s degree, 6.2% have an associate’s degree, and 12% have a graduate degree).  Only 
13.3% have a high school diploma/GED or attended only some high school:       
Chart 3. Education Distribution of Survey Respondents 
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 99.5% of the sample held United States citizenship, while 79.2% registered to vote in the 
2012 election.  Most voted for the office of President in the election (77.4%), while 63.5% voted 
for a Congress member and 49% voted for a social issue on the ballot.   
 Many respondents went to the Internet to learn about current events, with 60.5% citing 
online news sources (such as digital newspapers, Google News, and CNN.com) as their primary 
source of news (Chart 4). 14.3% watched network news programming as their primary news 
sources, while 2.4% cited Comedic Programming (The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, The 
Onion, or late-night talk shows as their primary source of information:  
Chart 4. Primary News Source Distribution of Survey Respondents 
 
7.4% of people reported learning about current events through comedic programming shows on a 
daily basis, while a sizable 20.8% say they get information from those programs several times in 
a week.  This result is comparable to the 9% of people who cited comedic programming as a 
“regular source of campaign information” in a recent study by the Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press (2012a.) 
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 After data recoding, the proportion of respondents who regularly watched The Daily 
Show or The Colbert Report was fairly even.  Regular consumers (people who watched this 
media daily, several times per week, or several times per month) made up 47.9% of the sample, 
compared to 52.1% of those who rarely or never watched the shows.  This variable serves as the 
primary independent variable throughout the statistical study, representing regular and non-
regular consumption of political satire. 
 In terms of self-reported political affiliation, the sample skewed toward the liberal end of 
the spectrum.  After recoding a seven-category scale (strongly conservative to strongly liberal) 
into three categories (conservative, independent, and liberal), 56% were considered liberal, 
compared to only 23% conservative, with 19% being independent (Chart 5).   
Chart 5: Political Beliefs Distribution of Survey Respondents 
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HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Hypothesis 1: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit lower levels of external efficacy 
compared to non-consumers. 
 Respondents were asked how strongly they agreed with five statements designed to 
measure external efficacy (whether or not they believe the government is responsive to citizen 
demands).  Three items were statements of positive efficacy: “U.S. citizens are able to influence 
national policy,” “U.S. citizens are able to influence local policy,” “My voice matters in the 
political conversation,” while two items were negative statements: “The political process is 
controlled by elites” and “Political discourse is dominated by the mass media.”  Agreement with 
the positive items and disagreement with the negative items indicates high efficacy, while 
disagreement with the positive items and agreement with the negative items indicates low 
efficacy.  I ran crosstabs on each item to see if there was a relationship between frequency of 
viewership and their levels of efficacy.   
 Tables 5 and 6 (see Appendix A) display the relationship between satire consumption and 
agreement as to whether U.S. citizens were able to influence public policy at the national and 
local levels of government.  Although only the later relationship was statistically significant 
(p=.011), in general, there was a stronger than expected sense of efficacy among satire viewers 
according to the responses to these positive questions.  While 57.4% of non-viewers agreed that 
U.S. citizens were able to influence local public policy, a remarkable 75% of satire viewers 
agreed with the statement.  Regular viewers were also less likely to disagree with the statement 
(8%) compared to non-viewers (21.3%). 
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Table 6. Satire Consumption and Efficacy on Local Public Policy Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
U S  citizens are able to 
influence local public 
policy  
Disagree 
Count 8 23 31 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
8.0% 21.3% 14.9% 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Count 17 23 40 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
17.0% 21.3% 19.2% 
Agree 
Count 75 62 137 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
75.0% 57.4% 65.9% 
Total 
Count 100 108 208 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.097
a
 2 .011 
Likelihood Ratio 9.403 2 .009 
Linear-by-Linear Association 8.997 1 .003 
N of Valid Cases 208   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.90. 
 
 Table 7 on the following page displays survey responses to the third positive item.  When 
asked about their perception of their own communicative power, a relatively low percentage 
(30.7%) believed that their voice mattered in the political conversation.   Comparing the 
responses, 38.8% of consumers agreed with the statement, compared to 23.4% of non-
consumers.  Meanwhile, more non-consumers thought their voice did not matter in the political 
conversation (45.8%) compared to regular consumers (38.8%).  This relationship was 
statistically significant (p=.053). 
 From these two models, we can conclude that within the population, people who watch 
political satire on a regular basis are more confident in their ability to influence local government 
and in their communicative power than are people who do not consume satirical media. 
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Table 7. Satire Consumption and Political Conversation Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
My voice matters in the 
political conversation  
Disagree 
Count 38 49 87 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
38.8% 45.8% 42.4% 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Count 22 33 55 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
22.4% 30.8% 26.8% 
Agree 
Count 38 25 63 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
38.8% 23.4% 30.7% 
Total 
Count 98 107 205 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.890
a
 2 .053 
Likelihood Ratio 5.916 2 .052 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.567 1 .059 
N of Valid Cases 205   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.29. 
 
 Although responses to the positive items indicated that many people believed they had a 
degree of influence over their governing institutions, they tended to agree even more strongly 
with the survey’s negative items, reflecting lower levels of external efficacy.  Tables 8 and 9 (see 
Appendix A) show that 71.0% of total survey respondents thought that the political process was 
controlled by elites (Table 8), and 73.2% thought that the media dominated the political 
conversation (Table 9).  Although the relationships between satire viewership and agreement 
with these two items were not statistically significant and cannot be generalized among the 
population, it is worth noting that observed relationships also refuted the hypothesis.  Despite the 
expectation that frequent viewers would be more aware of the media’s massively influential role 
in elections, they were actually less likely to agree with the statement that political discourse was 
dominated by mass media, as 69.7% of viewers agreed with this statement compared to 76.4% of 
non-viewers.  The same surprising trend occurred for the survey statement that the political 
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process was controlled by elites: 66.0% of regular viewers agreed with the item, compared to 
75.7% of non-viewers.  Regular viewers thus exhibited higher levels of efficacy on the negative 
items, although these relationships were not statistically significant. 
 In another measure of politically efficacy, I ran crosstabs to see if there was a relationship 
between satire consumption and actual voting behaviors.  Participation in the electoral process 
indicates a degree of efficacy, as people are only likely to vote if they believe that their vote will 
have an impact on representative offices, government structure, or public policy.  Table 10 
shows that satire viewers are significantly more likely to have cast a vote for the office of United 
States President in the 2012 election (p=.006); while 86.9% of satire viewers participated in this 
vote, only 68.5% of non-viewers did.   
 
Table 10. Satire Consumption and Presidential Vote Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Did you vote for the office 
of the United States 
President in the 2012 
election? 
Yes 
Count 86 74 160 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
86.9% 68.5% 77.3% 
No 
Count 12 33 45 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
12.1% 30.6% 21.7% 
Don’t know 
Count 1 1 2 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
1.0% 0.9% 1.0% 
Total 
Count 99 108 207 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.328
a
 2 .006 
Likelihood Ratio 10.700 2 .005 
Linear-by-Linear Association .012 1 .915 
N of Valid Cases 207   
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .96. 
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 Similarly, Table 11 shows that 73.7% of satire consumers voted for members of the 
United States Congress, compared to only 53.7% of non-viewers (p=.011).   
Table 11. Satire Consumption and Congressional Vote Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Did you vote for members 
of United States Congress 
in the 2012 election? 
Yes 
Count 73 58 131 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
73.7% 53.7% 63.3% 
No 
Count 22 43 65 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
22.2% 39.8% 31.4% 
Don’t know 
Count 4 7 11 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
4.0% 6.5% 5.3% 
Total 
Count 99 108 207 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.946
a
 2 .011 
Likelihood Ratio 9.066 2 .011 
Linear-by-Linear Association .731 1 .393 
N of Valid Cases 207   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.26. 
 
Together, these two models show that satire viewers were significantly more likely to participate 
in national elections than non-viewers, and therefore more likely to actively perform the civic 
role of voter.  
 Based on these results, there was no support for the hypothesis that consumption of 
political satire decreased external efficacy.  There was some statistical evidence, however, for the 
existence of the opposite relationship, as regular viewers were more confident in their ability to 
have their voice heard above the noise of political elites and media colonizers in order to 
influence their government.  They were also more likely to take an active role in the electoral 
process, indicating that they felt that their individual vote could make a difference in the political 
landscape. 
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Hypothesis 2: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit lower levels of trust toward 
governing and media institutions than non-consumers. 
 Five survey items were designed to measure institutional confidence, as adopted from 
General Social Survey (GSS Cumulative File, 1972-2006).  The respondents were asked to rate, 
on a three-point scale, how much confidence they had in the following institutions to 
competently perform their public role: National Press, Local Press, Federal Executive Branch 
(President), Federal Legislative Branch (Congress), and their local government.  I ran crosstabs 
to measure the relationship between satire consumption and levels of institutional trust.  
 In general, respondents reported little confidence in any of the institutions to competently 
perform their public roles (see Tables 13-17 in Appendix A).  Only 8% of respondents said that 
they had a great deal of confidence in the National Press (Table 13), 16.8% said that they had a 
great deal of confidence in the Federal Executive Branch (Table 15), and 7.5% said that they had 
a great deal of confidence in the Federal Legislative Branch (Table 16).  In each of the tables, the 
same trend is observable, which indicates that the sample’s satire viewers were more likely to 
report “a great deal of confidence” in each of the institutions, while non-viewers were more 
likely to report “hardly any confidence.”  Based on these results, there is no support for the 
hypothesis that regular viewers of satire exhibit lower levels of institutional trust compared to 
non-viewers.  There is some evidence for the existence of the opposite relationship, although 
none of the tests were statistically significant and therefore the relationship cannot be generalized 
for the population. 
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Hypothesis 3: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit more “republican” definitions 
of citizenship, in the Habermasian sense, compared to non-consumers. 
 Several survey items were designed to give an indication of the respondent’s 
conceptualization of citizenship, particularly as they defined the term in accordance to the 
Habermasian models described in earlier chapters.  One open-ended survey question asked 
respondents to provide their own definition of citizenship, which was coded to correlate with one 
of the three models based on their use of such concepts as “legality,” “membership,” and 
“nationality” (liberal citizenship) or “responsibility,” “participation,” and “loyalty” (republican 
citizenship). 
 Table 18 shows the frequencies with which each model appeared in survey respondents’ 
open-ended descriptions.  Note that no answers qualified as “deliberative,” and thus that model 
was dropped from subsequent statistical tests.  The majority (54.9%) gave definitions within the 
liberal model, while nearly a quarter of responses (25.1%) were republican in nature.  20% were 
a combination of both liberal and republican definitions.    
Table 18. Frequency Distribution of Habermasian Model of Citizenship 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Liberal 107 51.0 54.9 54.9 
Republican 49 23.3 25.1 80.0 
Both Liberal & Republican 39 18.6 20.0 100.0 
Total 195 92.9 100.0  
Missing System 15 7.1   
Total 210 100.0   
 
I then ran a regression on the two primary models of citizenship, to determine what variables are 
most likely to predict adherence to a particular model.  The independent variables examined 
were political affiliation, race, education, gender, age, and satire consumption.  The results are 
shown in Table 19 on the following page.  
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Table 19. Regression on Predictors of Liberal Citizenship 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .302
a
 .091 .061 .48419 
a. Predictors: (Constant), How would you describe your political beliefs?, What is your race? White/Other, What is 
the highest level of education you have completed?, What is your gender?, What is your age?, About how often do 
you watch full episodes or clips from The Daily Show or The Colbert Report? 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 597.059 822.265  .726 .469 
About how often do you 
watch full episodes or clips 
from The Daily Show or The 
Colbert Report? 
-.116 .033 -.268 -3.489 .001 
What is your age? .093 .040 .175 2.302 .022 
What is your gender? -.011 .075 -.011 -.146 .884 
What is your race? 
White/Other 
.146 .102 .107 1.435 .153 
What is the highest level of 
education you have 
completed? 
.015 .025 .042 .587 .558 
How would you describe your 
political beliefs? 
-.040 .021 -.141 -1.865 .064 
a. Dependent Variable: LiberalCitizenship 
 
The adjusted r-squared value in Table 14 indicates that 6.1% of the variance in adherence to a 
liberal model of citizenship is explained by the combined variables of age, gender, race, 
education, political beliefs, and satire consumption.  The relationship between level of satire 
consumption and liberal definitions of citizenship is statistically significant (p=.001), with an 
increase in viewing frequency corresponding to a decrease in the likelihood of belief in the 
liberal model of citizenship.  This finding supports the hypothesis that viewership would 
correspond with more republican views of citizenship. The only other significant predictor was 
age, with an increase in age corresponding to an increased likelihood of providing a liberal 
definition. 
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 Table 20 shows a regression using the same independent variables as predictors of 
republican citizenship.  Combined, satire consumption, age, gender, race, education, and political 
affiliation account for 9% of the variation in adherence to the republican model.  
Table 20. Regression on Predictors of Republican Citizenship 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .201
a
 .040 .009 .43455 
a. Predictors: (Constant), How would you describe your political beliefs?, What is your race? White/Other, What is 
the highest level of education you have completed?, What is your gender?, What is your age?, About how often do 
you watch full episodes or clips from The Daily Show or The Colbert Report? 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 340.665 737.959  .462 .645 
About how often do you 
watch full episodes or clips 
from The Daily Show or The 
Colbert Report? 
.038 .030 .101 1.274 .204 
What is your age? -.083 .036 -.180 -2.303 .022 
What is your gender? .004 .068 .005 .061 .951 
What is your race? 
White/Other 
-.065 .091 -.055 -.714 .476 
What is the highest level of 
education you have 
completed? 
-.012 .022 -.041 -.550 .583 
How would you describe your 
political beliefs? 
.019 .019 .079 1.017 .310 
a. Dependent Variable: RepublicanCitizenship 
 
In comparison, satirical consumption is less predictive of belief in the republican model.  As 
hypothesized, the relationship between satire consumption and belief in a republican model is 
positive, although not statistically significant (p=.204).  Again, age provides a significant 
predictor (p=.022) of republican definitions, with an increase in age corresponding to a decrease 
in likelihood of have a republican conception of citizenship. The lack of significant findings 
could be a function of the small number of republican definitions provided (49). 
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 To further investigate the relationship between respondents’ satire consumption and 
definitions of citizenship, I ran a crosstab and chi-square test:  
Table 21. Habermasian Model of Citizenship by Satire Consumption Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Habermasian model of 
citizenship 
Liberal 
Count 41 65 106 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
44.1% 64.4% 54.6% 
Republican 
Count 27 22 49 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
29.0% 21.8% 25.3% 
Both Liberal & 
Republican 
Count 25 14 39 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
26.9% 13.9% 20.1% 
Total 
Count 93 101 194 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.732
a
 2 .013 
Likelihood Ratio 8.808 2 .012 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.769 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 194   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.70. 
 
As expected, regular viewers of satire were more likely to agree with the republican model than 
non-viewers (29.0% compared to 21.8%), while non-viewers were more likely to ascribe to the 
liberal model than viewers (64.4% compared to 44.1%).  Also notable, a much greater 
percentage of regular viewers provided mixed liberal and republican definitions of citizenship 
(26.9% compared to 13.9% of non-viewers), suggesting that regular viewers gave more nuanced 
explanations which included elements of both models.  The results of the chi-square test reveal a 
statistically significant relationship between the variables (p=.013), allowing us to reject the null 
hypothesis in support of the research hypothesis.   
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 Because the sample contained a large percentage of people who identified as politically 
liberal, I introduced the control variable of political party, which was recoded into three 
categories from the original seven-category scale (Table 22). 
Table 22. Habermasian Model of Citizenship by Satire Consumption, Controlling for Political Affiliation (3 
parties) Crosstab 
Political Affiliation (3 parties) Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Conservative 
Habermasian 
model of 
citizenship 
Liberal 
Count 3 14 17 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
21.4% 50.0% 40.5% 
Republican 
Count 7 8 15 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
50.0% 28.6% 35.7% 
Both Liberal & 
Republican 
Count 4 6 10 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
28.6% 21.4% 23.8% 
Total 
Count 14 28 42 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Independent 
Habermasian 
model of 
citizenship 
Liberal 
Count 7 17 24 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
53.8% 73.9% 66.7% 
Republican 
Count 3 1 4 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
23.1% 4.3% 11.1% 
Both Liberal & 
Republican 
Count 3 5 8 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
23.1% 21.7% 22.2% 
Total 
Count 13 23 36 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Liberal 
Habermasian 
model of 
citizenship 
Liberal 
Count 31 33 64 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
47.7% 68.8% 56.6% 
Republican 
Count 16 13 29 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
24.6% 27.1% 25.7% 
Both Liberal & 
Republican 
Count 18 2 20 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
27.7% 4.2% 17.7% 
Total 
Count 65 48 113 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Habermasian 
model of 
citizenship 
Liberal 
Count 41 64 105 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
44.6% 64.6% 55.0% 
Republican Count 26 22 48 
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% within Satire 
Consumption 
28.3% 22.2% 25.1% 
Both Liberal & 
Republican 
Count 25 13 38 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
27.2% 13.1% 19.9% 
Total 
Count 92 99 191 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Political Affiliation (3 parties) Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Conservative 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.282
b
 2 .194 
Likelihood Ratio 3.435 2 .179 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.238 1 .266 
N of Valid Cases 42   
Independent 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.130
c
 2 .209 
Likelihood Ratio 3.034 2 .219 
Linear-by-Linear Association .277 1 .598 
N of Valid Cases 36   
Liberal 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.861
d
 2 .004 
Likelihood Ratio 12.529 2 .002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.327 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 113   
Total 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.916
a
 2 .012 
Likelihood Ratio 9.011 2 .011 
Linear-by-Linear Association 8.322 1 .004 
N of Valid Cases 191   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.30. 
b. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.33. 
c. 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.44. 
d. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.50. 
 
The original relationship was maintained for people who considered themselves conservative or 
independent, although these results were not statistically significant due to small sample size 
(note that many cells contain fewer than five cases).  66.7% of Independents exhibited liberal 
definitions of citizenship, with Independent non-viewers incredibly likely to give liberal 
definitions (73.9%).  The same trend occurs among political conservatives: 50% of conservative 
non-consumers have liberal conceptions of citizenship, while 21.4% of conservative consumers 
have liberal conceptions.  Meanwhile, 50% of conservative consumers exhibited republican 
conceptions of citizenship compared to 28.6% of conservative non-consumers. 
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 For people who placed themselves at the liberal end of the political spectrum, satire 
viewers were slightly less likely than non-viewers to give republican definitions of citizenship 
(24.6% compared to 27.1%).  Nearly half (47.7%) of frequent viewers gave citizen definitions in 
line with the liberal model, compared with 68.8% of non-viewers—a difference of 21.1%.  
Notably, only 4.2% of liberal non-viewers provided definitions that were both liberal and 
republican, compared with 27.7% of liberal viewers.  The chi-squared results show that the 
relationship between satirical consumption and citizenship model are significant only for those 
who identified on the liberal end of the political spectrum.  Based on these results, we can 
conclude that satire viewership is only predictive of citizenship conceptions for people who are 
politically liberal, with viewership more likely to reflect nuanced definitions of citizenship which 
incorporate both of the polarized models.  
 In addition to the survey item that asked respondents to provide their own definition of 
citizenship, I measured civic attitudes by asking respondents how important they thought it was 
for a citizen to enact a variety of behaviors.  Several items invoked republican duties (always 
vote in elections; help people in the community who have fewer resources; serve in the military; 
always obey laws; serve jury duty; pay taxes), while one item directly addressed liberal rights 
(protect personal rights), and one invoked a necessity of deliberative democracy (stay informed 
on current political and community issues).  I ran crosstabs on each item to measure the 
relationship between satire consumption and these specific civic values.  Four relationships had 
statistical significance (p<.05), each indicating that regular consumers of satire were more likely 
to view republican responsibilities and political knowledge as important aspects of citizenship.  
 Table 23 shows that 69% of satire viewers indicated that always voting in elections is 
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“very important,” compared to 45% of non-viewers.  Non-viewers were more likely than viewers 
to say that always voting was “not at all important” (15.6% compared to 5%). 
Table 23. Satire Consumption and Importance of Voting Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Always vote in elections: 
There are different 
opinions as to what it 
takes to be a good citizen 
How important is it for a 
citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 69 49 118 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
69.0% 45.0% 56.5% 
Somewhat important 
Count 26 43 69 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
26.0% 39.4% 33.0% 
Not important at all 
Count 5 17 22 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
5.0% 15.6% 10.5% 
Total 
Count 100 109 209 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.762
a
 2 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 14.167 2 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.574 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 209   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.53. 
 
 Similarly, satire consumers were more likely than non-consumers to believe that helping 
others in their community with fewer resources as “very important” (61.6% compared to 38.5%), 
while non-viewers were more likely to say it was “not at all important” (13.8% compared to 2%).  
The results are displayed in Table 25.  Additionally, Table 30 shows that 75% of satire viewers 
believed that paying taxes was very important, compared to 56.9% of non-viewers; 10.1% of 
non-viewers did not think that this financial contribution was important, compared to 1% of 
viewers. 
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Table 25. Satire Consumption and Importance of Charity Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Help people in the 
community who have 
fewer resources: There 
are different opinions as 
to what it takes to be a 
good citizen. How 
important is it for a 
citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 61 42 103 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
61.6% 38.5% 49.5% 
Somewhat important 
Count 36 52 88 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
36.4% 47.7% 42.3% 
Not important at all 
Count 2 15 17 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
2.0% 13.8% 8.2% 
Total 
Count 99 109 208 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.911
a
 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 17.221 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.424 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 208   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.09. 
 
Table 30: Satire Consumption and Importance of Paying Taxes Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Pay taxes: There are 
different opinions as to 
what it takes to be a good 
citizen. How important is 
it for a citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 76 62 138 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
76.0% 56.9% 66.0% 
Somewhat important 
Count 23 36 59 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
23.0% 33.0% 28.2% 
Not important at all 
Count 1 11 12 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
1.0% 10.1% 5.7% 
Total 
Count 100 109 209 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.253
a
 2 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 13.675 2 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.661 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 209   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.74. 
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 Also notable, more satire viewers thought that good citizenship involved staying 
informed on political and community issues (Table 24).  61.2% of viewers rated it as very 
important (compared to 45.9% of non-viewers), while 11.0% of non-viewers did not think it was 
important at all (compared to 0% of viewers).  
Table 24. Satire Consumption and Importance of Staying Informed Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Stay informed on current 
political and community 
issues: There are different 
opinions as to what it 
takes to be a good citizen.  
How important is it for a 
citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 60 50 110 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
61.2% 45.9% 53.1% 
Somewhat important 
Count 38 47 85 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
38.8% 43.1% 41.1% 
Not important at all 
Count 0 12 12 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
0.0% 11.0% 5.8% 
Total 
Count 98 109 207 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.315
a
 2 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 17.916 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.772 1 .002 
N of Valid Cases 207   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.68. 
 
The above results show that regular viewers of political satire were more likely than non-viewers 
to think that responsibilities of the republican model were important, further supporting the 
hypothesis.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
INTRODUCTION 
 Statistical analysis of survey responses revealed three important conclusions about people 
who regularly consume news parody.  Satire viewers displayed higher levels of external political 
efficacy, defined as their perceived ability to exert influence on their governing structures, 
compared to non-viewers.  Satire viewership did not significantly correlate with levels of 
confidence in government or media institutions.  Finally, satire viewers were more likely than 
non-viewers to define citizenship in the republican sense, emphasizing the connections and 
responsibilities toward members of the same political communities.  The following chapter will 
discuss why these patterns may have emerged from the data.  It will connect the results with 
earlier literature and theory, while introducing some original insights about the role of political 
satire in the social lives of American citizens.   
 
EFFICACY  
 The observed positive correlation between consumption of news-style political satire and 
feelings of efficacy suggests that The Daily Show and The Colbert Report do not breed cynical 
citizens in the manner that Baumgartner and Morris (2006, 2011) described.  In fact, people who 
watch these programs on a regular basis were found to be more likely to believe in the ability of 
U.S. citizens to influence public policy and have their own voices included in the political 
conversation.  Despite the shows’ regular themes of political elitism, media manipulation, and 
citizen disenfranchisement, viewers felt that they were still able to make a difference in national 
and local politics.   
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 These results perhaps speak to what type of person is the typical satire consumer: a 
demographic study of news show audiences by the Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press (2012c) reports that Daily Show and Colbert Report viewers tend to be under the age of 30, 
male, college-educated, and in a higher income bracket than the average American news 
consumer.  Any combination of these factors could account for higher levels of political efficacy.  
In a society where young white educated males are more likely than other groups to engage in 
mainstream politics, they are also more likely to benefit from their political engagement in terms 
of successfully earning legislative support for their particular interests.  Satire viewers also lean 
disproportionately towards one end of the political spectrum: Democrats make up 45% of the 
audiences of both The Daily Show and The Colbert Report, while only 10% and 12% of their 
respective audiences are Republican (Pew 2012c).  In the wake of a Presidential election in 
which the populist Democratic candidate was victorious, it is likely that Democratic-voting 
citizens were feeling more responsible for their candidate’s political success and were 
experiencing an inflated sense of efficacy.  The observed patterns may have been less significant 
if the survey had been conducted at a different point in time, perhaps after a Republican political 
victory or during a neutral time in the election cycle, when feelings of efficacy might drop 
among the Democrats who make up the majority of the satire audience.  
 Additional results from this survey show that political satire viewers are significantly 
more likely to have cast a vote for President and members of Congress in the 2012 election.  This 
finding supports some of the previous literature that revealed a positive correlation between 
satire viewership and politically active behaviors such as attending campaign events, joining 
political organizations (Cao and Brewer 2008) and participating in political discussions (Young 
and Esralew 2011).  Again, we cannot assume that watching politically-topical comedy programs 
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causes increased political engagement and participation, but we can again revisit the theoretical 
explainations proposed by these researchers.  Cao and Brewer (2008:97) propose that satire 
might raise internal efficacy, induce anxiety which sparks political action, or create positive 
shared experiences that lead to further participation.  Further, Young and Esralew (2011) found 
that political knowledge was not a mediating factor between satire consumption and political 
participation, which suggests that the messages absorbed from watching satire likely have a 
strong effect on an individual’s political behavior regardless of prior knowledge or information 
learned from other sources.  Based on the results of the current study, there appears to be a strong 
relationship between satire viewership, external efficacy, and the likelihood of voting in 
elections.               
 The correlation between satire viewership, feelings of efficacy and voting behavior 
indicates that this type of discourse does not discourage political participation among groups of 
people who are already likely to be politically engaged.  In this sense, the texts help to rationalize 
the existing relationship between citizens and government for this group of people.  The very 
existence of alternative media discourses gives citizens a sense of resistance against the 
colonizing forces of the mass media, and the feeling that it is possible to take control of how the 
government and media interact to construct our social reality.  Although the United States is far 
from Habermas’ ideal of deliberative democracy, in which policy decisions are rationalized 
when every person exercises their communicative power in the debate, political satire serves as a 
place-holder, and perhaps as a catalyst encouraging participation.  The comedians use their own 
communicative power to challenge the dominant media narratives and suggest that it is 
possible—and necessary—for ordinary Americans to do the same.       
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INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE  
   Similar to that of efficacy, the consumption of political satire correlated with an increased 
confidence in the people in charge of government and mass media institutions to perform their 
jobs competently.  On the surface, this result is quite surprising, considering how regularly these 
media texts use government and journalistic incompetence as the source of mockery.  Although 
this relationship was not significant and cannot be generalized for the population, we can again 
attempt to explain the unanticipated finding by considering the type of person who is regularly 
consuming news parody.  Because frequent viewers are likely to be more informed and engaged 
in political processes compared to other types of news audiences and therefore have a greater 
understanding of the complex systems of representative government, they may transfer their 
sense of internal efficacy to confidence in the governing institutions that represent them.  In other 
words, if individuals consider themselves knowledgeable about the political realm and competent 
in their role as an actively engaged citizen, they may also believe that the people whom they 
have elected to represent them are competent in their public roles.    
 As for satire viewers’ increased confidence in the press, it stands to reason that people 
who regularly use mass media to learn political information are more likely to report that they 
trust their sources; otherwise, they would not watch or read the news.  Viewers of political satire, 
although regularly exposed to the ideas of media-constructed narratives and numerous instances 
of misinformation, are probably not going to be deterred from seeking political information 
through mediated texts.  Thus, they will report higher levels of trust in the press as part of their 
attempt to legitimize the information they have received and rationalize the political reality it has 
helped them construct.  (Note, however, that the lack of significance associated with this finding 
limits our ability to apply this conclusion to the general population of satire viewers.)  There is 
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an important difference between this audience and audiences of “real” news programs (as will be 
discussed later in this chapter), which lies in their fine-tuned ability to deconstruct media 
narratives and maintain a healthy skepticism against their information sources rather than 
passively accepting any intrinsic factuality of mediated information.   
 Thus, political satire serves a legitimating function, even for the institutions that it mocks.  
By co-opting the journalistic conventions of the nightly news, cable news programs, and print 
newspapers, The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion are reasserting the importance 
of those media texts for the health of American democracy.  Despite the fact that the mass media 
has largely colonized the political discourse in the country and created a potentially dangerous 
situation, the press remains a critical connection between governing bodies and ordinary citizens.  
As an alternative discourse, new parody works to mitigate some of these dangers, while at the 
same time legitimating the press’ core purpose by boosting viewer’s faith in mediated political 
information.       
  
CITIZENSHIP 
 Survey takers overwhelmingly defined citizenship as a legal status in accordance with the 
liberal model.  To reside in America and possess the right to vote in one’s own interest remains 
the overarching sense of the concept, in line with the nation’s cultural values of individualism 
and preserving personal liberties.  Despite the modern expansion of the welfare state and 
growing global emphasis on social rights, American citizenship remains tied to its historical 
roots in the “private space,” valuing the autonomy of the individual over ties to the collective 
(Turner 1990).  
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 Although news parody is growing in popularity, it remains appealing to a niche audience, 
a fact that perhaps reinforces the very fragmentation of contemporary society.  If we think about 
fake news as just one of the many choices of information sources available in today’s diverse 
media landscape, then preference for satirical news can cement feelings of individuality and 
egoism.  If the “public arena” is understood in America as “individual involvement in local 
voluntary associations” (Turner 1990:209), we may to conceptualize the choice to watch political 
satire as membership in a type of voluntary association.  The audience of The Daily Show (or any 
other politically-centered television program) is a collective of like-minded media consumers 
who “participate” in politics through viewership.  And because television viewership is a private, 
individual act, satire consumers are unlikely to think about citizenship in terms of their civic 
relationship with others (as in the republican model).     
 Such an explanation may account for the fact that the sample as a whole, including satire 
consumers, was more likely to display liberal conceptions of citizenship over republican ones.  
Despite individual participation in this voluntary association, however, regular viewers of satire 
were more likely to talk about civic responsibilities and their social dependency on their 
neighbors—a relationship that was not explained by political party affiliation.  In fact, politically 
conservative and independent satire viewers were slightly more likely than both liberal viewers 
and non-viewers to ascribe to the republican model of citizenship.  This suggests that satirical 
messages that stress civic responsibility may have a greater influence on people who do not share 
the same political views as the comedians tend to espouse.
4
    
 In this study, there was significant support for the hypothesis that political satire 
promotes a republican conception of American citizenship by stressing civic duty and the 
                                                          
4
 Both Stewart and Colbert have made it known that they lean democratic, although Teten (2011-2012) argues 
through a content analysis that the public perception that The Daily Show is “left-leaning” is a misnomer, as the 
show tends to skewer both sides to a fairly equal extent. 
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importance of political engagement as a way to uphold the traditional values of the country.  
Habermas (1998) believed that in the republican model, politics was considered part of the 
socialization process, the medium through which individuals become aware of their mutual 
dependence on one another (p.240).  To be legitimate, the society based on republican 
citizenship requires a sphere of political discourse that is oriented toward creating mutual 
understandings of the social world and allow us to work together as a functional community.  
The mass media indeed serves that role, whether it is in the form of “real” journalism or satirical 
mocking of the administration’s shortcomings.  The fake news creates a mutual understanding of 
what it means to be a citizen, even when it draws those definitions from a spirit of cynicism.  
Most importantly, it tells viewers to be keenly aware of every public relationship they have in 
this world, whether it is with business partners, with neighbors, with policy makers, or with 
information sources.  Individuals can maintain their private interests and civic rights while 
recognizing their co-dependencies with fellow citizens.  The government, therefore, is seen as a 
legitimate form of social control because the process of political will-formation is designed to 
suit the common interest.  
 It is also important to note the absence of Habermas’ ideal form of deliberative 
democracy in both the content of political satire and in the open definitions of survey 
respondents.  It is evident that the competition between doctrinal worldviews suffocates the 
negotiation of plural interests through communicative action.  It is not difficult to see how the 
media has colonized the political conversation in the presence of the four social conditions laid 
out by Habermas, which has effectively abstracted the average individual from the political 
process.  The low levels of external efficacy and confidence in governing institutions across the 
board makes it clear that Americans feel significantly less involved in politics than if deliberative 
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democracy was enacted which would allow every voice to participate in the rational decision-
making process.   
 Because deliberative power is in the hands of the mass media, most political journalism 
texts construct a view of citizenship that casts public individuals as participants in the self-
interested group bargaining sessions.  In the news narratives, particularly around election season, 
citizens are talked about as party members, candidate supporters, or at the very least, voters who 
will have to ultimately pick a side.  To some extent, the satirical texts are guilty of the same 
characterization, as discovered in this study’s content analysis.  This conception is rational, but 
problematic when partisan interests do not accurately or completely meet the needs of the entire, 
fragmented community.  
 Fake news programs are also unable to represent the interests of every citizen who is not 
accounted for in the partisan debate.  However, they do serve as a proxy, to remind us that 
alternative voices do exist, and by increasing their visibility, we are able to come to more rational 
decisions regarding legislative acts.  The “Rally to Restore Sanity and/or Fear” is perhaps the 
ultimate attempt by the comedians’ to add more discursive voices to the political conversation 
and to invigorate a more deliberative decision-making process.  Political satire attempts to 
coordinate social understanding not via the tenets of capitalism (information as a source of 
profit), but via the potential communicative power of individuals.         
 
A MORE COMPELLING, COMPLEX INFORMATION SOURCE? 
 A typical newscast or newspaper delivers information on current events in a particular 
manner that is specifically constructed to eliminate bias and increase objectivity.  Whether those 
ideals are achieved or not is clearly debatable, but a resolution is not necessary to this discussion.  
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What is important is the way in which the news constructs the role of citizen in relation to the 
government, and how that conception might be challenged by the media that parody it.  I argue 
that a primary difference between “real” and “fake” news is the level of cognitive engagement 
each demands from its viewers.  Conventionally, “real” journalism provides information in the 
form of superficial facts presented without editorial, which is expected to be absorbed into the 
consciousness of the consumer without any analytic concerns.  In contrast, Stewart, Colbert and 
The Onion ask viewers to engage with the topic at hand, encouraging them to think critically 
about the consequences of government action and the relationship that every individual person 
has to their governing institutions. 
 Perhaps this is one explanation for the optimism of satire viewers.  Michael Schudson 
(1999) argued that audiences of network and cable news are pessimistic about the state of our 
union because political reporting is filtered through a cynical press corps.  Journalists, he 
believes, are growing increasingly contemptuous of authority, while at the same time pandering 
to audiences by appealing to the least common denominator.  So while the mainstream press has 
largely failed to properly educate the electorate on complex issues of politics, the fake news has 
provided alternative narratives that encourage viewers to explore and try to understand the 
complexity of a government system that they cannot directly experience.  Although the comedic 
anchors express cynicism about the competency of the people running these institutions, their 
ability to abandon conventions of objectivity leaves open a space for shades of grey.  Most 
critically, they encourage a more systematic view of social problems (e.g. rigid structures of 
inequality and the lack of progressiveness in partisan ideologies), rather than simply blaming the 
people at the top.   
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 Furthermore, by hosting interviews with both top political figures and analysts from a 
variety of academic fields, the satirists frame the actions of individual leaders within a larger 
political, economic, and social framework.  Instead of learning about the day’s events as a series 
of isolated news items, viewers are given a chance to make connections between the actions of 
the institutions that govern them and the world they also personally experience.  Parody is, as 
Robert Hariman (2008) believes, bringing political discourse closer to the audience’s experience 
and thus giving them a greater sense of civic connection.  If the real news abstracts individuals 
from the political realm, as Habermas argues in his theory of media colonization, the fake news 
may serve re-integrating functions to give them a stronger sense of civic duty.   
 Similarly, while the mainstream narratives highlight conflict among political elites, 
effectively reducing viewers’ faith in their government (Cappella and Jameison 1997), satirical 
narratives caution their viewers not to buy into those narratives.  Instead, they expose the very 
constructedness of the news and leave open the possibility that our leaders are, in fact, competent 
and trustworthy, even though we can poke fun at them.  The mainstream media’s insistence on 
emphasizing partisanship leads to a worldview in which particular social circumstances are 
entrenched and virtually unchangeable due to the stubbornness of party ideologies.  When this 
notion is ironically deconstructed, and we are shown the larger picture in which social 
circumstances are always negotiable, we see the possibilities for transformation.       
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 It may be somewhat ironic that my hypothesis, which guessed that political satire was 
ultimately harmful to democracy based on the ways that it might increase cynicism and attitudes 
of ironic detachment from society, was cynical in its very nature.  I myself am I regular viewer of 
the Comedy Central programs and frequent visitor to The Onion’s website, where I indeed learn 
about things happening in Washington and around the world in a manner that I find humorous 
and highly engaging.  Although I often find myself feeling somewhat downtrodden after  
consuming this kind of media (a feeling often summed up in the incredulous or defeated looks 
Jon Stewart gives the camera at the end of a segment about the absurd behaviors of our nation’s 
political leaders), I now understand that these types of shows have given me certain tools for 
navigating my socio-political world that viewers of a typical broadcast might not have.  Through 
this brand of comedy, I have learned the value of skepticism, grown to feel connected to the 
community of viewers, developed a stronger awareness of how government action relates to my 
own life, and found enjoyment in the process of gathering political information.  Through the 
writing of this thesis, I have grown to see the ways in which political satire can be empowering 
and can make valuable contributions to a healthy democracy.  Perhaps counter-intuitively, news 
parody counteracts anti-intellectual trends in news media by adding complexity.  Further, the 
genre can demystify political processes and make them more accessible to the average American. 
 Additional research on this topic should continue to examine the specific ways in which 
ironic and humorous discourses shape political engagement, and in what contexts the messages 
of political satire might be more impactful on an audience.  It should further investigate 
mediating factors that may be able to explain or refute the conclusion that political satire creates 
a more informed, engaged, analytical, confident, or community-oriented citizen.  Finally, it 
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should more thoroughly analyze the content of contemporary political satire as it reacts to 
ongoing trends in political journalism and mass media more generally.   
 As Geoffrey Baym discussed, political comedy is not merely an example of the ways 
information and entertainment content are being conflated in contemporary media practices.  
Rather, it is an innovative way of “speaking about, understanding, and acting within the world 
defined by the permeability of form and the fluidity of content” (2006:262).  The “fake news” 
genre plays with the informational content and delivery in a way that allows ordinary citizens to 
see themselves as part of a political system that operates on communicative action.  It promotes 
the notion that dialogue must serve as the “locus of democracy,” where citizens determine their 
preferences as private citizens and define their political will with an orientation toward the public 
interest (p.273).  Ultimately, this study supports Baym’s argument that news parody, when 
performed successfully, has discursively integrative functions that are critical in modern 
American political society.  
  An increased sociological focus on modern political journalistic practices and news 
parody is important for understanding how various discourses affect individuals’ worldviews as 
well as systems of social organization.  On the issue of structural legitimation in the face of 
social fragmentation, we can see that alternative political discourses actually help create more 
trusting worldviews and strengthen political communities.  Satire legitimates existing 
organizational structures while suggesting ways it might be modified to better serve the 
populace.  In a society characterized by fragmentation and risk, political communities and 
conceptions of citizenship are being redefined.  Whereas political communities used to be 
created, sustained, and rationalized through civic discourse between neighbors, new media 
technologies are pushing debate outside the face-to-face public sphere and into a virtual space 
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where it is steered by media industry and political elites.  Satire’s social function lies not simply 
in its attempt to keep our nation’s leaders honest and attuned to citizen concerns.  It also 
socializes citizens to participate in the democratic process by encouraging them to re-engage 
with the political discourse, develop rational opinions about political issues, and grow to see the 
society’s organizational structures as legitimate forms of social control.  Most importantly, it 
inspires optimism, by suggesting that our country’s social problems can be solved through 
government action if we continue to challenge the status quo and push for more democratic 
modes of discourse.  
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Demographics 
1) What is your age?* 
( ) under 18 
( ) 18-24 
( ) 25-34 
( ) 35-54 
( ) 55+ 
 
2) What is your gender? 
( ) Male 
( ) Female 
 
3) What is the highest level of education you have completed?* 
( ) Some high school 
( ) High school/GED 
( ) Some college 
( ) Associate's degree 
( ) Bachelor's degree 
( ) Master's degree 
( ) Doctorate degree 
( ) Law degree 
( ) Medical degree 
( ) Trade or other technical school degree 
 
4) What is your race? 
[ ] White 
[ ] Black 
[ ] Latino 
[ ] Asian 
[ ] Other race 
[ ] Prefer not to answer 
 
5) Are you a United States citizen?* 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
 
Voting 
6) Did you register to vote in the 2012 election? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
( ) Don't know 
 
7) Did you vote for the office of the United States President in the 2012 election? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
( ) Don't know 
 
8) Did you vote for members of United States Congress in the 2012 election? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
( ) Don't know 
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9) Did you vote on any social issues on the ballot in the 2012 election? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
( ) Don't know 
 
 
News  
10) How often do you learn about current events from the following outlets? 
 
Daily 
Several days 
per week 
Several days 
per month 
Rarely Never 
Print newspaper (e.g. The 
New York Times, USA 
Today, The Daily Record) 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Network news programs 
(e.g. ABC's Good Morning 
America, NBC's Nightly 
News, local news 
broadcasts) 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Cable news programs 
(CNN's Anderson Cooper 
360, MSNBC's The Rachel 
Maddow Show, FoxNews' 
Fox and Friends) 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Radio programs (NPR, 
national or local talk radio) 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Online news source (e.g. 
digital newspapers, Google 
News, CNN.com) 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Political blog (e.g. Daily 
Kos, The Huffington Post, 
Little Green Footballs) 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Comedic programming 
(The Daily Show, The 
Colbert Report, The 
Onion, late-night talk 
shows) 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
 
11) Which of the following is your primary source of news? 
( ) Print newspaper 
( ) Network news program 
( ) Cable news program 
( ) Radio program 
( ) Online news source 
( ) Political blog 
( ) Comedic Programming 
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Comedy Programs 
12) About how often do you watch full episodes or clips from The Daily Show or The Colbert Report? 
( ) Daily 
( ) Several times per week 
( ) Several times per month 
( ) Rarely 
( ) Never 
 
13) About how often do you read an article or watch a video produced by The Onion? 
( ) Daily 
( ) Several times per week 
( ) Several times per month 
( ) Rarely 
( ) Never 
 
 
Political Participation 
14) Do you consider yourself politically engaged? 
( ) Very engaged 
( ) Somewhat engaged 
( ) Not engaged at all 
( ) Not sure 
 
15) How often do you participate in the following activities? 
 
Daily 
Several times 
per week 
Several times 
per month 
Several times 
per year 
Less 
than 
once a 
year 
Never 
Discussing or debating 
political matters with 
family or friends 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Discussing or debating 
political matters in an 
online forum 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Reading books or in-
depth articles on 
political figures or 
political issues 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Watching televised 
political debates 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Volunteering for 
political campaigns 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Participating in 
political protests 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
 
16) How would you describe your political beliefs? 
( ) Strongly conservative 
( ) Moderately conservative 
( ) Slightly conservative 
( ) Independent 
( ) Slightly liberal 
( ) Moderately liberal 
( ) Strongly liberal 
( ) Not sure 
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Efficacy 
17) How much confidence do you have in the groups of people running the following institutions to 
competently perform their public roles? 
 
A great deal of 
confidence 
Only some 
confidence 
Hardly any 
confidence 
Don't know 
National Press ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Local Press ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Federal Executive 
branch 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Federal Legislative 
branch 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Local government ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
 
18) Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree Strongly agree 
U.S. citizens are able to 
influence national 
public policy. 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
U.S. citizens are able to 
influence local public 
policy. 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
The political process is 
controlled by elites. 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Political discourse is 
dominated by the mass 
media. 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
My voice matters in the 
political conversation. 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
 
 
 
 
19) How do you define "citizenship"? 
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Citizenship 
20) There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. How important is it for a citizen to do 
the following things? 
 
Very important Somewhat important Not important at all 
Always vote in elections ( )  ( )  ( )  
Stay informed on current 
political and community 
issues 
( )  ( )  ( )  
Help people in the 
community who have fewer 
resources 
( )  ( )  ( )  
Serve in the military ( )  ( )  ( )  
Always obey laws ( )  ( )  ( )  
Protect personal rights ( )  ( )  ( )  
Serve jury duty ( )  ( )  ( )  
Pay taxes ( )  ( )  ( )  
 
 
HIT completion code 
21) Please create a five-digit code and enter it in the box below. Remember this code. You will be required to 
enter the same five digits to complete the HIT.* 
____________________________________________  
 
 
Thank You! 
Thank you for taking our survey. Your response is very important to us. Please return to mTurk and enter 
your five-digit code in the text box.  
 
 
  
117 
 
APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL TABLES 
 
Table 1. Models of Citizenship in Satirical Texts 
Type of Citizenship The Daily Show 
(n=20) 
The Colbert 
Report (n=20) 
The Onion 
(n=20) 
Total  
(n=60) 
Percentage of 
Total  
Liberal  0 5 1 6 10.0% 
Republican 4 5 5 14 23.3% 
Deliberative 0 0 0 0 0.00% 
Neutral 7 5 6 18 30.0% 
Media colonization 9 5 8 22 36.6% 
 
 
Table 2. Campaign-Related Topics in Satirical Texts 
Campaign-Related  
Sub-topics  
The Daily 
Show (n=20) 
The Colbert 
Report (n=20) 
The Onion 
(n=20) 
Total 
(n=60) 
Percentage 
of Total 
Presidential politics 18 15 16 49 82.0% 
Congressional politics 1 2 2 5 8.3% 
Televised debate 9 2 8 19 31.7% 
Media spectacle 7 8 9 24 40.0% 
Media partisanship 9 8 2 19 31.7% 
Campaign funding/spending 2 1 2 5 8.3% 
Negative campaigning 3 0 2 5 8.3% 
Rhetorical hypocrisy 5 2 2 9 15.0% 
Bribery/corruption 0 2 1 3 5.0% 
Conspiracy theories 0 6 0 6 10.0% 
Anti-intellectualism 3 4 2 9 15.0% 
Political partisanship 7 2 1 10 16.7% 
 
 
Table 3. Political Issues Topics in Satirical Texts 
Political Issues 
Sub-topics 
The Daily 
Show (n=20) 
The Colbert 
Report (n=20) 
The Onion 
(n=20) 
Total  
(n=60) 
Percentage of 
Total 
Religion 2 1 2 5 8.3% 
Sexual morality 1 2 5 8 13.3% 
Domestic economy 5 2 3 9 15.0% 
Foreign Policy 5 1 1 7 11.7% 
Healthcare 0 0 1 1 1.7% 
Natural disaster aid 0 2 1 3 5.0% 
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Table 4. Citizenship and Voter Topics in Satirical Texts 
Citizen and Voter  
Sub-topics 
The Daily 
Show (n=20) 
The Colbert 
Report (n=20) 
The Onion 
(n=20) 
Total  
(n=60) 
Percentage of 
Total 
Citizen Partisanship 5 4 2 11 18.3% 
Voter disenfranchisement 0 2 1 3 5.0% 
Voter rights 0 4 1 5 8.0% 
Voter responsibilities 3 1 2 6 10.0% 
Citizen voices 4 1 5 10 17.0% 
Public opinion 3 3 3 9 15.0% 
Voter demographics 2 5 1 8 13.3.% 
Racial minorities 1 1 1 3 5.0% 
 
 
Table 5. Satire Consumption and Efficacy on National Public Policy Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
U S  citizens are able to 
influence national 
public policy 
Disagree 
Count 28 36 64 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
28.3% 33.0% 30.8% 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Count 19 28 47 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
19.2% 25.7% 22.6% 
Agree 
Count 52 45 97 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
52.5% 41.3% 46.6% 
Total 
Count 99 109 208 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.754
a
 2 .252 
Likelihood Ratio 2.761 2 .251 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.762 1 .184 
N of Valid Cases 208   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.37. 
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Table 6. Satire Consumption and Efficacy on Local Public Policy Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
U S  citizens are able to 
influence local public 
policy  
Disagree 
Count 8 23 31 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
8.0% 21.3% 14.9% 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Count 17 23 40 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
17.0% 21.3% 19.2% 
Agree 
Count 75 62 137 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
75.0% 57.4% 65.9% 
Total 
Count 100 108 208 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.097
a
 2 .011 
Likelihood Ratio 9.403 2 .009 
Linear-by-Linear Association 8.997 1 .003 
N of Valid Cases 208   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.90. 
 
 
Table 7. Satire Consumption and Political Conversation Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
My voice matters in the 
political conversation  
Disagree 
Count 38 49 87 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
38.8% 45.8% 42.4% 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Count 22 33 55 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
22.4% 30.8% 26.8% 
Agree 
Count 38 25 63 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
38.8% 23.4% 30.7% 
Total 
Count 98 107 205 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.890
a
 2 .053 
Likelihood Ratio 5.916 2 .052 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.567 1 .059 
N of Valid Cases 205   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.29. 
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Table 8. Satire Consumption and Political Elites Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
The political process is 
controlled by elites  
Disagree 
Count 13 6 19 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
13.0% 5.6% 9.2% 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Count 21 20 41 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
21.0% 18.7% 19.8% 
Agree 
Count 66 81 147 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
66.0% 75.7% 71.0% 
Total 
Count 100 107 207 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.902
a
 2 .142 
Likelihood Ratio 3.962 2 .138 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.582 1 .058 
N of Valid Cases 207   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.18. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Satire Consumption and Mediated Political Discourse Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Political discourse is 
dominated by the mass 
media  
Disagree 
Count 11 7 18 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
11.1% 6.6% 8.8% 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Count 19 18 37 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
19.2% 17.0% 18.0% 
Agree 
Count 69 81 150 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
69.7% 76.4% 73.2% 
Total 
Count 99 106 205 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.639
a
 2 .441 
Likelihood Ratio 1.645 2 .439 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.585 1 .208 
N of Valid Cases 205   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.69. 
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Table 10. Satire Consumption and Presidential Vote Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Did you vote for the office 
of the United States 
President in the 2012 
election? 
Yes 
Count 86 74 160 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
86.9% 68.5% 77.3% 
No 
Count 12 33 45 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
12.1% 30.6% 21.7% 
Don’t know 
Count 1 1 2 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
1.0% 0.9% 1.0% 
Total 
Count 99 108 207 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.328
a
 2 .006 
Likelihood Ratio 10.700 2 .005 
Linear-by-Linear Association .012 1 .915 
N of Valid Cases 207   
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .96. 
 
 
Table 11. Satire Consumption and Congressional Vote Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Did you vote for members 
of United States Congress 
in the 2012 election? 
Yes 
Count 73 58 131 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
73.7% 53.7% 63.3% 
No 
Count 22 43 65 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
22.2% 39.8% 31.4% 
Don’t know 
Count 4 7 11 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
4.0% 6.5% 5.3% 
Total 
Count 99 108 207 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.946
a
 2 .011 
Likelihood Ratio 9.066 2 .011 
Linear-by-Linear Association .731 1 .393 
N of Valid Cases 207   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.26. 
 
122 
 
Table 12. Satire Consumption and Social Issues Vote Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Did you vote on any social 
issues on the ballot in the 
2012 election? 
Yes 
Count 55 48 103 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
55.0% 44.0% 49.3% 
No 
Count 37 53 90 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
37.0% 48.6% 43.1% 
Dont know 
Count 8 8 16 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
8.0% 7.3% 7.7% 
Total 
Count 100 109 209 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.938
a
 2 .230 
Likelihood Ratio 2.948 2 .229 
Linear-by-Linear Association .019 1 .889 
N of Valid Cases 209   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.66. 
 
 
Table 13. Satire Consumption and Confidence in National Press Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
National Press: How 
much confidence do you 
have in the groups of 
people running the 
following institutions to 
competently perform 
their public roles? 
A great deal of 
confidence 
Count 10 6 16 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
10.3% 5.8% 8.0% 
Only some confidence 
Count 56 56 112 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
57.7% 53.8% 55.7% 
Hardly any confidence 
Count 31 42 73 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
32.0% 40.4% 36.3% 
Total 
Count 97 104 201 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.417
a
 2 .299 
Likelihood Ratio 2.431 2 .297 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.317 1 .128 
N of Valid Cases 201   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.72. 
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Table 14. Satire Consumption and Confidence in Local Press Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Local Press: How much 
confidence do you have 
in the groups of people 
running the following 
institutions to 
competently perform 
their public roles? 
A great deal of 
confidence 
Count 12 13 25 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 
Only some confidence 
Count 64 54 118 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
66.0% 51.4% 58.4% 
Hardly any confidence 
Count 21 38 59 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
21.6% 36.2% 29.2% 
Total 
Count 97 105 202 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.478
a
 2 .065 
Likelihood Ratio 5.540 2 .063 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.734 1 .098 
N of Valid Cases 202   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.00. 
 
 
Table 15. Satire Consumption and Confidence in Federal Executive Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Federal Executive 
branch: How much 
confidence do you have 
in the groups of people 
running the following 
institutions to 
competently perform 
their public roles? 
A great deal of 
confidence 
Count 20 13 33 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
21.3% 12.6% 16.8% 
Only some confidence 
Count 45 46 91 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
47.9% 44.7% 46.2% 
Hardly any confidence 
Count 29 44 73 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
30.9% 42.7% 37.1% 
Total 
Count 94 103 197 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.176
a
 2 .124 
Likelihood Ratio 4.200 2 .122 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.145 1 .042 
N of Valid Cases 197   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.75. 
 
124 
 
 
Table 16. Satire Consumption and Confidence in Federal Legislature Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Federal Legislative 
branch: How much 
confidence do you have 
in the groups of people 
running the following 
institutions to 
competently perform 
their public roles? 
A great deal of 
confidence 
Count 9 6 15 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
9.4% 5.8% 7.5% 
Only some confidence 
Count 38 41 79 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
39.6% 39.8% 39.7% 
Hardly any confidence 
Count 49 56 105 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
51.0% 54.4% 52.8% 
Total 
Count 96 103 199 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .936
a
 2 .626 
Likelihood Ratio .939 2 .625 
Linear-by-Linear Association .587 1 .444 
N of Valid Cases 199   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.24. 
 
 
Table 17. Satire Consumption and Confidence in Local Government Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Local government: How 
much confidence do you 
have in the groups of 
people running the 
following institutions to 
competently perform 
their public roles? 
A great deal of 
confidence 
Count 12 11 23 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
12.4% 10.5% 11.4% 
Only some confidence 
Count 56 51 107 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
57.7% 48.6% 53.0% 
Hardly any confidence 
Count 29 43 72 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
29.9% 41.0% 35.6% 
Total 
Count 97 105 202 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.687
a
 2 .261 
Likelihood Ratio 2.700 2 .259 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.045 1 .153 
N of Valid Cases 202   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.04. 
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Table 18. Frequency distribution of Habermasian model of citizenship 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Liberal 107 51.0 54.9 54.9 
Republican 49 23.3 25.1 80.0 
Both Liberal & Republican 39 18.6 20.0 100.0 
Total 195 92.9 100.0  
Missing System 15 7.1   
Total 210 100.0   
 
 
 
Table 19. Regression on Predictors of Liberal Citizenship 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .302
a
 .091 .061 .48419 
a. Predictors: (Constant), How would you describe your political beliefs?, What is your race? White/Other, What is 
the highest level of education you have completed?, What is your gender?, What is your age?, About how often do 
you watch full episodes or clips from The Daily Show or The Colbert Report? 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 597.059 822.265  .726 .469 
About how often do you 
watch full episodes or clips 
from The Daily Show or The 
Colbert Report? 
-.116 .033 -.268 -3.489 .001 
What is your age? .093 .040 .175 2.302 .022 
What is your gender? -.011 .075 -.011 -.146 .884 
What is your race? 
White/Other 
.146 .102 .107 1.435 .153 
What is the highest level of 
education you have 
completed? 
.015 .025 .042 .587 .558 
How would you describe your 
political beliefs? 
-.040 .021 -.141 -1.865 .064 
a. Dependent Variable: LiberalCitizenship 
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Table 20. Regression on Predictors of Republican Citizenship 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .201
a
 .040 .009 .43455 
a. Predictors: (Constant), How would you describe your political beliefs?, What is your race? White/Other, What is 
the highest level of education you have completed?, What is your gender?, What is your age?, About how often do 
you watch full episodes or clips from The Daily Show or The Colbert Report? 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 340.665 737.959  .462 .645 
About how often do you 
watch full episodes or clips 
from The Daily Show or The 
Colbert Report? 
.038 .030 .101 1.274 .204 
What is your age? -.083 .036 -.180 -2.303 .022 
What is your gender? .004 .068 .005 .061 .951 
What is your race? 
White/Other 
-.065 .091 -.055 -.714 .476 
What is the highest level of 
education you have 
completed? 
-.012 .022 -.041 -.550 .583 
How would you describe your 
political beliefs? 
.019 .019 .079 1.017 .310 
a. Dependent Variable: RepublicanCitizenship 
 
Table 21. Habermasian Model of Citizenship by Satire Consumption Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Habermasian model of 
citizenship 
Liberal 
Count 41 65 106 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
44.1% 64.4% 54.6% 
Republican 
Count 27 22 49 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
29.0% 21.8% 25.3% 
Both Liberal & 
Republican 
Count 25 14 39 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
26.9% 13.9% 20.1% 
Total 
Count 93 101 194 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.732
a
 2 .013 
Likelihood Ratio 8.808 2 .012 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.769 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 194   
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Table 22. Habermasian Model of Citizenship by Satire Consumption, Controlling for Political Affiliation (3 
parties) Crosstab 
Political Affiliation (3 parties) Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Conservative 
Habermasian 
model of 
citizenship 
Liberal 
Count 3 14 17 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
21.4% 50.0% 40.5% 
Republican 
Count 7 8 15 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
50.0% 28.6% 35.7% 
Both Liberal & 
Republican 
Count 4 6 10 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
28.6% 21.4% 23.8% 
Total 
Count 14 28 42 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Independent 
Habermasian 
model of 
citizenship 
Liberal 
Count 7 17 24 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
53.8% 73.9% 66.7% 
Republican 
Count 3 1 4 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
23.1% 4.3% 11.1% 
Both Liberal & 
Republican 
Count 3 5 8 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
23.1% 21.7% 22.2% 
Total 
Count 13 23 36 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Liberal 
Habermasian 
model of 
citizenship 
Liberal 
Count 31 33 64 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
47.7% 68.8% 56.6% 
Republican 
Count 16 13 29 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
24.6% 27.1% 25.7% 
Both Liberal & 
Republican 
Count 18 2 20 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
27.7% 4.2% 17.7% 
Total 
Count 65 48 113 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Habermasian 
model of 
citizenship 
Liberal 
Count 41 64 105 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
44.6% 64.6% 55.0% 
Republican 
Count 26 22 48 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
28.3% 22.2% 25.1% 
Both Liberal & 
Republican 
Count 25 13 38 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
27.2% 13.1% 19.9% 
Total 
Count 92 99 191 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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(Table 23 Continued) Chi-Square Tests 
Political Affiliation (3 parties) Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Conservative 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.282
b
 2 .194 
Likelihood Ratio 3.435 2 .179 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.238 1 .266 
N of Valid Cases 42   
Independent 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.130
c
 2 .209 
Likelihood Ratio 3.034 2 .219 
Linear-by-Linear Association .277 1 .598 
N of Valid Cases 36   
Liberal 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.861
d
 2 .004 
Likelihood Ratio 12.529 2 .002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.327 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 113   
Total 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.916
a
 2 .012 
Likelihood Ratio 9.011 2 .011 
Linear-by-Linear Association 8.322 1 .004 
N of Valid Cases 191   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.30. 
b. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.33. 
c. 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.44. 
d. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.50. 
 
 
Table 23. Satire Consumption and Importance of Voting Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Always vote in elections: 
There are different 
opinions as to what it 
takes to be a good citizen 
How important is it for a 
citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 69 49 118 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
69.0% 45.0% 56.5% 
Somewhat important 
Count 26 43 69 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
26.0% 39.4% 33.0% 
Not important at all 
Count 5 17 22 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
5.0% 15.6% 10.5% 
Total 
Count 100 109 209 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.762
a
 2 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 14.167 2 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.574 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 209   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.53. 
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Table 24. Satire Consumption and Importance of Staying Informed Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Stay informed on current 
political and community 
issues: There are different 
opinions as to what it 
takes to be a good citizen  
How important is it for a 
citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 60 50 110 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
61.2% 45.9% 53.1% 
Somewhat important 
Count 38 47 85 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
38.8% 43.1% 41.1% 
Not important at all 
Count 0 12 12 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
0.0% 11.0% 5.8% 
Total 
Count 98 109 207 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.315
a
 2 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 17.916 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.772 1 .002 
N of Valid Cases 207   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.68. 
 
 
 
Table 25. Satire Consumption and Importance of Charity Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Help people in the 
community who have 
fewer resources: There 
are different opinions as 
to what it takes to be a 
good citizen. How 
important is it for a 
citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 61 42 103 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
61.6% 38.5% 49.5% 
Somewhat important 
Count 36 52 88 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
36.4% 47.7% 42.3% 
Not important at all 
Count 2 15 17 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
2.0% 13.8% 8.2% 
Total 
Count 99 109 208 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.911
a
 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 17.221 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.424 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 208   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.09. 
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Table 26. Satire Consumption and Importance of Military Service Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Serve in the military: 
There are different 
opinions as to what it 
takes to be a good citizen. 
How important is it for a 
citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 11 8 19 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
11.1% 7.5% 9.3% 
Somewhat important 
Count 40 49 89 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
40.4% 46.2% 43.4% 
Not important at all 
Count 48 49 97 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
48.5% 46.2% 47.3% 
Total 
Count 99 106 205 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.156
a
 2 .561 
Likelihood Ratio 1.159 2 .560 
Linear-by-Linear Association .021 1 .886 
N of Valid Cases 205   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.18. 
 
 
 
Table 27. Satire Consumption and Importance of Obeying Laws Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Always obey laws: There 
are different opinions as 
to what it takes to be a 
good citizen.  How 
important is it for a 
citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 44 62 106 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
45.8% 56.9% 51.7% 
Somewhat important 
Count 49 42 91 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
51.0% 38.5% 44.4% 
Not important at all 
Count 3 5 8 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
3.1% 4.6% 3.9% 
Total 
Count 96 109 205 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.284
a
 2 .194 
Likelihood Ratio 3.291 2 .193 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.425 1 .233 
N of Valid Cases 205   
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.75. 
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Table 28. Satire Consumption and Importance of Protecting Personal Rights Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Protect personal rights: 
There are different 
opinions as to what it 
takes to be a good citizen.   
How important is it for a 
citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 75 79 154 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
75.0% 73.8% 74.4% 
Somewhat important 
Count 23 25 48 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
23.0% 23.4% 23.2% 
Not important at all 
Count 2 3 5 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
2.0% 2.8% 2.4% 
Total 
Count 100 107 207 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .151
a
 2 .927 
Likelihood Ratio .152 2 .927 
Linear-by-Linear Association .080 1 .777 
N of Valid Cases 207   
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.42. 
 
 
 
Table 29. Satire Consumption and Importance of Serving Jury Duty Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Serve jury duty: There 
are different opinions as 
to what it takes to be a 
good citizen. How 
important is it for a 
citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 43 37 80 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
43.0% 33.9% 38.3% 
Somewhat important 
Count 41 48 89 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
41.0% 44.0% 42.6% 
Not important at all 
Count 16 24 40 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
16.0% 22.0% 19.1% 
Total 
Count 100 109 209 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.217
a
 2 .330 
Likelihood Ratio 2.225 2 .329 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.194 1 .139 
N of Valid Cases 209   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.14. 
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Table 30. Satire Consumption and Importance of Paying Taxes Crosstab 
 Satire Consumption Total 
Regular 
Consumption 
Little to No 
Consumption 
Pay taxes: There are 
different opinions as to 
what it takes to be a good 
citizen.  How important is 
it for a citizen to do the 
following things? 
Very important 
Count 76 62 138 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
76.0% 56.9% 66.0% 
Somewhat important 
Count 23 36 59 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
23.0% 33.0% 28.2% 
Not important at all 
Count 1 11 12 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
1.0% 10.1% 5.7% 
Total 
Count 100 109 209 
% within Satire 
Consumption 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.253
a
 2 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 13.675 2 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.661 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 209   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.74. 
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